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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation investigates per capita income convergence, inequality and 
return to human capital in China after the 1978 policy of reform and opening. It also 
considers the impact of the household registration system and migration policy on the 
labor market changes. 
1 
CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation investigates per capita income convergence, inequality and return to 
human capital in China after the 1978 policy of reform and opening. In particular, this 
dissertation considers the impact of the household registration system and migration policy 
on the labor market changes. The following is the background of labor market in China. 
The household registration was established in the 1950s by the government during the 
period of central planning. The main mechanisms for enforcing the planned economy 
included the unified procurement and sale of agricultural commodities, and the Household 
Registration System that designated the legal place of residency and work for the entire 
population (Fleisher, 2003). Hence, rural industries were remained subsidiary to agriculture. 
The labor force within rural areas was governed under the communes who have to reach the 
production targets from the planning authorities. Urban labor arrangements under central 
planning included labor allocation by labor bureaus; hukou required for housing, food 
subsidy, schooling and health benefits.  
Since there’s an excessive concentration of capital in urban areas and of labor in rural 
areas (after the rural market reform from a planned economy to market oriented economy), 
the pressure of rural to urban migration has been magnified that reduce the demand for farm 
workers. In mid-1980s, the government relaxed the controls on labor mobility to solve the 
misallocation of labor between rural and urban sectors, as well as between agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities. However, the hukou system still take effect and became the most 
important legal barrier to rural to urban migration. After the restrictions on migration were 
gradually lifted, less rural workers were engaged in agricultural activities, they start to seek 
employment in urban area. These floating people are increasing each year, although the 
2 
incomplete hukou status subjects them the risk of public safety as well as the economic costs, 
for example, schooling, health care, wage and so on. 
For urban market, the reform starts later. Under free market, workers seek jobs where 
pay is the greatest and firms tend to locate their production where pay is lowest. Because of 
the special economic zones and foreign direct investment (lead to the expansion of the non-
state or private enterprises), the income growth rate increased but diverges, raising the 
income inequality (for both inter-urban disparity and rural-urban gap). One possible reason is 
the education investment and the return to schooling. There is evidence that the return to 
schooling has been lower than in comparable transition and emerging economies. The market 
reform would push the wage of educated workers closer to their marginal product. Hence, the 
reform will lead to rising income inequality in China. 
To summarize, the reform and open policy in China changed its labor force from an 
immobile to a mobile one, especially for rural workers. In addition, the market oriented 
economy improved the welfare of employees since the wage changed from the planned one 
to market oriented one.  
There are three research questions discussed in this dissertation. First question is 
motivated by the increasing growth rate after reform and the reallocation of labor force and 
asks is there any convergence pattern in regional per capita income. Second question focus 
on industry level income and asks what factors lead to the regional income inequality. Third 
question is related to the return to schooling over the transition, how the return has changed 
over time. 
 
 
3 
CHAPTER 2.    PER CAPITA INCOME CONVERGENCE IN CHINA, 1994-2015 
2.1 Introduction 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 and follow-up labor market reforms 
in 1978, there were radical changes in China’s labor market. Since then China has become 
the fastest growing economy in the world. However, economic growth across provinces has 
been uneven. Chen and Fleisher (1997) researched on the post-reform income inequality in 
China, and they found income convergence during the reform period but income inequality 
rose between the coastal and inland regions since late 1980s because of the lower factor 
productivity in the noncoastal provinces. Also, due to the shift of rural to industrial reforms 
and the fiscal transfers to the relatively richer inland provinces, income convergence was 
slowing down.  
Several reasons motivate us to reinvestigate the question of China’s regional per 
capita income convergence. First, most studies only focused on the reform period in China, 
few studies have focused on the most recent years’ income convergence pattern. Second, 
with the industrial reform and the migration of the labor force from agricultural to industry, 
the intra-provincial human capital mobility can contribute to the convergence of output per 
worker across Chinese provinces. Third, the increased pace of investment in human capital 
can also support the convergence.  
As suggested by Restuccia and Rogerson (2017), living standard differs across 
countries are due to the misallocation effect: low income countries are not as effective in 
allocating their factors of production to their most efficient use. The misallocation includes 
the market imperfections (monopoly power, market frictions, and enforcement of property 
rights); government or other entities’ favor or penalization to specific firms; and statutory 
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provisions (code vary with firm vary with firm characteristics, labor market regulations, 
tariffs, and land regulations). For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that state 
ownership in China created higher inefficiency. Various reform enacted during the period of 
1998-2005 reduced the distortions and lead to a decrease in misallocations in China. 
Adamopoulos et al. (2016) found that misallocation in the agricultural sector in China has 
remained roughly constant for the period of 1993-2002, which is due to the uniformly 
distributed land among household members registered in the village and then the farm 
productivity is not related to land allocation. Tombe and Zhu (2013) provided evidence on 
the change of internal frictions of labor (and goods) mobility across spaces and sectors in 
China on aggregate productivity. They found that the reduction of internal migration frictions 
and trade restrictions account for about half of the growth in China between 2000 and 2005. 
Hence, I suggest the labor reallocation from less productive sectors to more productive 
sectors are key to growth in China. 
This chapter undertakes a study of convergence in per capita income across provinces 
of China from 1994-2015, and over sub-periods 1994-2004 and 2005-2015, conditioning on a 
small set of economic factors generally observed at the beginning of the period. These 
variables are share of labor force in agriculture, average years of schooling completed, and 
net inflow migration rate.  My hypotheses are: (i) regions with a lower share of agricultural 
workers (industrial transformation) will have higher convergence because these farm workers 
have skills that are less transferable to the nonfarm sector; (ii)  regions with higher average 
education (higher investment in human capital) will have a higher rate of convergence 
because they are better able to adjust to changing labor markets; (iii) regions with higher net 
out migration will have higher convergence because migrants generally move from low to 
5 
higher wage areas, which should raise wages in the exiting region. Since the transition at the 
earlier period allowed the relatively richer coastal provinces to benefit disproportionately, I 
assume the convergence is more likely to present in the later subperiod.  
Section 2 provides some literature on the growth pattern across countries in the world. 
To better understand per capita income convergence across provinces in China, I will 
improve the traditional beta convergence model and provide the details of mathematical 
derivations of new variables in section 3. And I will then describe the inputs related to human 
capital reallocation and their impact on the regional growth in section 4. Section 5 describes 
the data I used. After that, I conduct the convergence model to test my hypotheses mentioned 
above in section 6. Section 7 concludes and the regional income inequality issue China will 
have after dramatic growth. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
There are many studies that discuss growth rate patterns and convergence or 
divergence across countries in the world covering various periods of time. 
Pritchett (1997, 2000) distinguished two types of economies: industrial/developed 
countries primarily by membership in OECD and developing countries as the rest (China is 
one of the developing countries). He found that the growth rates for developed economies 
show similar patterns from 1870-1989, even the poorer members of this group grew 
sufficiently faster to produce considerable convergence in absolute per capita income levels. 
However, the growth rates were substantially lower in the developing countries than in the 
industrial countries, producing divergence in relative incomes. The gap in growth rates 
between industrial and developing countries grew substantially from 1982-1992. However, 
6 
China and India are two exceptions. The average GDP per capita growth rate of the OECD 
members from 1982-1992 was 0.3 percent, but in China, the per capita income growth rate 
for this period was 7.4 (the World Bank).  
The variance in growth rates across countries is also much larger among developing 
countries: the range of annual growth from 1960 to 1990 was from -2.7 percent to positive 
6.9 percent (Pritchett, 1997). Therefore, among the developing countries, there have been 
strikingly different patterns of growth, with some converging rapidly on the leaders while 
others stagnate. In contrast, there has been no obvious acceleration of overall growth rates in 
developed countries since 1870. With a negative correlation between growth rates and initial 
per capita income, the much larger variance in growth rates among countries that began the 
period below $3,000 is striking. China is an exception in that it began the period below 
$1000 in per capita income and has higher annual growth than other developing countries.  
The wider range of growth experience among developing countries is also seen in 
comparing the extremes. Growth differentials of this magnitude produce rapid shifts in 
relative incomes. Although China was a poor country 50 years ago, its nominal GDP 
surpassed the United Kingdom in 2006 and Japan in 2008, making it the world’s second 
largest economy after the United States. However, when calculating the growth rate in per 
capita GDP between 1870 and 1960, China is one third of the average for developed 
countries. Hence, China’s per capita income diverged significantly relative to the leaders 
from 1870 to 1960.  
Pritchett (2000) uses simple patterns to summarize income growth patterns over time.  
For China, the patterns of GDP per capita growth are classified as climbing a hill. He defined 
the Hills class as countries with growth rates higher than 1.5 percent in each period (1960-
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1992) and with a relatively stable trend (hence, higher R-squared). Like the United States, 
most of the OECD countries are classified in the Hills group. Hence, China, as a developing 
country, has the similar characteristics of growth pattern as industrial countries. However, 
most developing countries fall into Mountains and Plains classes, experiencing implosive 
declines or stagnation in the growth rate. Hence, the “advantage to backwardness” by gaining 
significantly on the leaders is historically rare. Pritchett (2000) also suggested using cross-
sectional analysis of changes in growth rates over time and research on the determinations 
(policies) on the evolution of potential growth because volatility and instability of growth in 
developing countries make the fixed effects panel data approach meaningless. 
Durlauf et al (2005) provided a summary of econometric tools that have been 
employed to study economic growth relative to USA for the period 1960-2000. In their 
statistics, the GDP per capita in China is slightly lower than India in 1960, and then China 
catches up with India in 2000. However, per capita income in China relative to the US was 
much lower—only one tenth relative to USA in 2000. Like the conclusion from Pritchett, 
they found a diversity of growth rates, especially at lower levels of development. For many 
developing countries, growth was significantly lower after 1980, with many countries seeing 
a decline in real GDP per worker except for China and India. Hence, there was higher 
dispersion of national growth rates, with East and Southeast Asia being (temporary) winners. 
In the aspect of long-run output volatility, industrialized countries are relative stable, not all 
developing countries have higher volatility: South Africa is less volatile than the USA, Sri 
Lanka less volatile than Canada, and Pakistan less volatile than Switzerland. In their study of 
empirical growth rates, they suggested that details of individual countries (case study), 
including historical, political and institutional context, may be important. Theory and 
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evidence should be connected by supplanting calibration of theoretical models. Different 
types of growth (for example, open economy) and distinguished consequences should be 
considered.  
Dufrenot et al (2012) focuses on developing countries, and studies the properties of 
the transient dynamics that characterized the catch-up of the poor countries to the rich long-
run per capita incomes. He mentioned the speed of convergence process because the growth 
convergence in the developing countries displays slow transition dynamics, and the steady-
state is not necessarily observed. Hence, the rejection of convergence does not necessarily 
indicate that they are diverging. The extreme cases – “fast convergence” or divergence are 
relaxed and non-stationary models are employed to test catch-up dynamics. He argued that 
the observed catch-up growth that characterizes the emerging economies does not necessarily 
produce convergence in per-capita income levels. The reason is that when a country starts to 
experience sustained increases in per capita income, the efficiency of resources allocation 
and constraints could encumber this process and restrict future growth.  
Their aim is to see whether the disparities between the rich and the poor become 
widen or narrow over time. Instead of using cross-sectional concept, they use the integration 
framework to explain the slow catch-up and suggest that the convergence models can yield a 
phenomenon of “growth resistance” to long-run equilibrium. The method to break growth 
resistance is by new government policies (through technical improvement, cultural change 
and social adoption). They conclude that growth convergence in the developing countries is 
idiosyncratic and there’s no way to drive the economies in such a way that they ultimately 
converge towards each other. Low technology adoption/absorption capacity and the different 
manner economic transitions across countries are the two main reasons for divergence. As for 
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China, they indicated “an initial phase of divergence from the group, followed by catching-
up and then convergence”. 
2.3 A Methodological Issue: Spatial Dependence in Provincial Income Data 
There are several studies in empirical research on regional economic growth that 
discuss the sources of regional income inequality and convergence. Building on the Solow 
model and following empirical application (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995), these studies regress the growth rates of regional per capita GDP over the 
sample period on the initial level of regional per capita GDP plus variables that could affect 
the steady-state rate of growth such as the nonhuman capital investment rate and average 
schooling levels. However, their aggregate level research on convergence has ignored the 
importance of inter-regional differences or spillover effects on each country’s rate of per 
capita income convergence, i.e., the growth rate in a region would depend not only on its 
own initial income level but also on its neighbors. There’s no doubt that the existence of 
production and trade linkages, and the clustering of factors affecting productivity, such as 
technological and knowledge spillovers, are some of the most important factors related to 
spatial effects.  Part of the spatial dependence seems likely to be correlated with initial period 
value of per capita income, and ignoring this spatial correlation is likely to change the 
estimated rate of convergence in per capita income across regions.   
Although there are a series of chapters showing that the presence of spatial effects 
matter in the estimation of the beta-convergence process, spatial spill-overs have been largely 
ignored in regional growth studies for China. Ying (2003) estimates the output growth for 
China using provincial data from 1978–1998 and using spatial lag model to determine the 
source of growth. The results suggest negative spatial autocorrelation, which is interpreted as 
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polarizing process undergoing within the Chinese spatial economies. Jeon (2007) tests 
Kaldorian spatial econometric approach using Chinese regional data and finds that regional 
dependence is very weak among the Chinese provinces. Conversely, Madariaga and Poncet 
(2007) rely on data at the sub-national level across cities to estimate a dynamic panel growth 
equation taking into account the issue of spatial dependence. Their results suggest significant 
spatial dependence and, hence, find a higher speed of convergence. In addition to beta-
convergence, Lin et al. (2006) use spatial econometric techniques to investigate provincial 
sigma-convergence in China and find a relative lower level of dispersion in the economic 
development process. Tian (2010) investigates the regional convergence at a largely 
disaggregated level over 1991-2007 using the spatial Durbin growth model. They find strong 
evidence of positive spatial dependence between Chinese prefectures. Also, they find 
significant conditional convergent forces when the spatial spillover effects are controlled. 
Hence, the robust of spatial dependence in China is still under debate.  
Before I conduct the convergence model, I will test whether the per capita income 
levels of provinces close to each other are correlated. To do this I apply a spatial model 
developed by Getis and Ord (1992) and conduct a test of no spatial effects using the statistic 
of Moran’s I. This statistic is expressed as follows (Moran 1948): 
 
𝐼 =
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦)(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦)
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦)2𝑖
 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the real per capita income of province 𝑖, 𝑦 is the mean per capita income of 
China, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the element of the distance matrix W between each pair of provinces and 
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖  is a factor that corresponds to the sum of all the weights. With regard to the 
interpretation of Moran’s I, it should be noted that a significant positive value indicates 
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positive spatial dependence, while a significant negative value reflects a pattern of spatial 
association between dissimilar values. 
The results obtained (see table 2.1) are very significant, so we reject the null 
hypothesis that there is zero spatial autocorrelation present in the variable 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 at α  = .01. 
Furthermore, it shows that positive spatial dependence increase slightly during period 1994-
2005, suggesting growing importance of economic spillover among provinces that are close 
neighbors, and then decrease slightly during period 2005-2015 when inter-province migrants 
were traveling longer distances for work.  This means that factors affecting the performance 
of a given province have a larger influence on neighboring provinces before 2005 than in 
later years. 
The filtering method removes inter-province spatial effect, converts spatially 
dependent variables (𝑦𝑖) into spatially independent ones ( 𝑦𝑖
𝐹). Hence, the filtered variables 
can be interpreted as that part of the provincial per capita income not explained by the 
spillover effects from the other provinces. he filtering methodology is defined as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
𝐹 = 𝑦𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝛿)𝑗
(𝑁 − 1)𝐺𝑖(𝛿)
 
Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the element of the distance matrix between each pair of provinces defined in 
Moran’s I (𝑤𝑖𝑗 = (𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−𝛿 , where  𝛿 = 1, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between provinces i and j, N is 
the number of provinces (N=31), 𝑦𝑖 is the observed lnGDP, G is: 
𝐺𝑖(𝛿) =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝛿)𝑗 𝑦𝑗
∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗
, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
The only difference between 𝑦𝑖 and its filtered counterpart 𝑦𝑖
𝐹 is a spatial variable, with a 
positive value indicating clustering of higher values of 𝑦𝑖  and a negative value indicating 
clustering (or spatial autocorrelation) of lower 𝑦𝑖 values. Also, these newly-generated spatial 
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variables (𝑦𝑖
𝐹) are associated, but not correlated with 𝑦𝑖. Hence, in my estimated of the 
growth convergence model for Chinese provinces, I will use both the unfiltered and filtered 
data.  
2.4 Empirical Model Description and Hypotheses of Convergence 
After we solve the spatial problem, we can do the analysis of convergence. The 
convergence model is as follows: 
(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑇 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)/𝑇
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃1994 + 𝛽3𝐷2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃2004 + 𝛽4𝐷3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃2010 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the province-level real GDP per person, T is the length of the period or sub-
period growth, 𝑋 contains conditioning variables that may explain convergence. 𝐷1 = 1 if in 
period 1994-2004, 𝐷2 = 1 if in period 2004-2010,  𝐷3 = 1 if in period 2010-2015. 
Short descriptions of the variables are as follows: 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 - Natural log of per capita GDP; 
Aglabor (%) - Percentage of agriculture workers among all labor force; Edu - Average years 
of schooling completed; 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (%) - (Inflow population-outflow population)/total 
national floating population; 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 - Interaction term 
between 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒. 
In equation (1) the evidence for growth convergence is summarized in the following 
expression: 
(1) , , , 2 3 ,[(ln ln ) / ] / ln( )i t T i t i t i tGDP GDP T GDP NetInflo + −  = +  < 0. 
In the standard growth convergence model, 3  is zero, and hence, 2  < 0 for conditional 
convergence.   
The neoclassical theory of growth focuses on two types of sources: capital and labor. 
Here, I mainly focus on the human capital, especially the labor reallocation, to explain the 
growth gap between developed and developing area in China. Hence, three basic economic 
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indicators are selected, they are share of agriculture labor force, education and net inflow 
migration rate.  
After the progress of economic reforms in 1978, there were radical changes in the 
labor-market. The fundamental changes in the distribution of the labor force have been the 
main feature of the rural labor market in China since the inception of reforms (Fleisher, 
2006). From 1978 to 2014, the share of workers in the agricultural sector have declined from 
71 to 30 percent, but the share of workers in industry rose from 18 to 30 percent and the 
share in services rose from 12 to 40 percent (Li, 2017). Several empirical evidence has 
shown that the rapid expansion of nonfarm activities had accounted for an increasing portion 
of the total farm income growth. As a consequence, the shift of labor from less productive to 
more productive sectors can accelerate growth. To examine the contribution of this structural 
transformation to the recent Chinese growth performance, the variable Aglabor is added. 
Provinces that have a larger share of its labor force employed in agriculture at the beginning 
of the growth period under analysis, are expected to have lower rates of per capita income 
convergence. The main reason is that they have skills that are not easily transferable to non-
farm work.  
During the reforms of the late 1970s, nonfarm jobs and urban employment in the non-
state sector have grown rapidly. The transition from farm sector to nonfarm sector drives 
most rural workers to seek positions in urban area. Hence, internal labor migration become a 
new phenomenon in China’s last half century. Connecting the rural-urban labor markets, 
there are about 77 million rural migrants working temporarily in cities in 2000 (Cai, 2003b).  
In addition, internal migration in China has a feature that “labor flows basically direct from 
the interior to coastal areas, and from central and western regions to eastern areas”, which is 
14 
due to the discrepancy of wage level in different provinces (see table 2.2). During the 
reforms, the government created a series of special economic zones (SEZs) that are mainly 
located in coastal areas to attract foreign investment. They are relatively free of federal 
bureaucracy, regulations, and interventions. SEZs are also listed separately in the national 
planning reports (including financial planning) and have province-level authority on 
economic administration and legislation authority. Hence, the uneven allocation of natural 
resources and state policies were biased toward coastal provinces and cities in China, and this 
seems to have caused the eastern region to become richer and the western region to become 
poorer. For example, the average annual income for workers with high school degree, middle 
school degree and elementary school degree in coastal area was 1.56, 1.6 and 1.39 times 
higher than in interior regions, respectively (table 2.2). Hence, many workers migrated to the 
coastal areas to pursuit higher wage rates. The reallocation of labor to more productive 
regions seems likely to be an important part of Chinese economic growth during the post 
reform period. Cai and Wang (1999) concluded that labor reallocation, including labor 
transfers among regions, have accounted for 21 percent of annual GDP growth in the post-
reform years. Hence, the variable provincial net in migration rate is added to measure the 
growth after the reform. I hypothesize that provinces with higher net in-migrants would have 
lower per capita income convergence. The main reason is the overly optimist expectations of 
obtaining a job in the new area frequently creates a backlog of people waiting for jobs in 
urban areas. 
Education plays an important role in adults’ ability to respond to labor and 
commodity market disequilibrium that are associated with economic growth (Schultz 1975). 
And there’s a broad consensus that differences in human capital account for 10-30 percent of 
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country income differences. Li (2017)’s research based on the Chinese population Census in 
1980 and 2010 shows that education has risen rapidly since the Cultural Revolution in 1976, 
with the average years of schooling for China’s adult labor force rising from 4.3 years in 
1980 to 9.6 years in 2010. Some studies assumed the education is the dominant source of 
economic growth. Fleisher (2010) found that education investment in developing, interior 
regions generate more return than in developed, eastern regions in China. Hence, it is 
interesting to test its contribution to the performance of Chinese economy, especially the 
different education investment by local government across provinces over time. I hypothesize 
that provinces that have an adult education population with high education levels will have a 
higher rate of convergence of per capita GDP.  
 
2.5 Data Description 
The data for this study is from the China Statistical Yearbook. The data reported in 
this yearbook are largely collected in surveys conducted by local governments and then 
summarized by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (NBS).  
This yearbook reports key statistical data in recent years and some historically important 
years at the national level and the local levels of province (31), autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government. Its annual reports cover 
comprehensively the economics and social developments of China.  
The target time period of our study is after economic reforms, 1994-2015, but I also 
split the 20-year period into two sub-period 1994-2004, and 2004-2015 (further split into 
2004-2010 and 2010-2015). The per capita GDP is measured by provincial GDP divide by 
the resident population. The resident population is the number of people who actually live in 
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a certain location for more than a half year and the data are collected at year end. Hence, the 
per capita GDP can be affected by the number of migrants. The national cost of living index 
is used to covert per capita GDP data into real GDP per capita. However, to the extent that 
the cost of living varies across regions, this is also a possible source of measurement error.  
 The education, aglabor data are all from the different years of Census Data from 
NBS. The average schooling years are used to estimate the education level. It’s calculated by 
adding the percentage of surveyed people completed each degree multiply by the estimated 
schooling years to complete this degree. Aglabor is measure by the number of labor 
participate in farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery sectors dividing by the total 
employed people. 
The net inflow migration data is from Chan’s summary of interprovincial migration 
data, 1990-2005 (Chan, 2008). He indicates and the data source is from the National 
Statistics Bureau (NSB, 2002, 2007). The net inflow rate is summarized into three subperiod: 
1990-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. The net rate is calculated by total inflow population 
minus total outflow population as percentage of all migrating population in China. I use the 
1990-1995 period data as my net inflow rate at the beginning period of 1994-2004 and the 
2000-2005 period date as my net inflow rate at the beginning period of 2005-2015. I use the 
2010 Population Census from NBS to calculate the net inflow rate for 2010.  
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Summary of data 
The Figure below (Figure 2.1) shows the variation of per capita GDP. We can see that 
the variation increases slightly from 1994 to 2004, then decrease sharply. Therefore, it seems 
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that convergence is not occurring in the early period but that convergence is much more 
likely in the most recent period.  
A major factor affecting convergence starting in 2004 is a series of labor policy 
changes in China. During 2002-2004, two documents were initialized and legalized to protect 
migrant workers from labor market discrimination and guarantee a safe working 
environment. In 2006, a system was established to monitor wage delivery to migrant workers 
and protect their labor rights. In 2003, urban governments and public schools started to 
respond giving s’ children equal access to education. Those policies have improved the 
working environment for migrants and hence attracted more migration activities across 
provinces. In addition, the new Hu-Wen Administration was planning for conservative 
economic growth starting in 2005 (the GDP growth rate has decreased from 2007 (14.2%) to 
2016 (6.7%)). The Scientific Outlook on Development is one of the guiding principles, and it 
focuses on correcting the unbalanced growth. This socio-economic principle proposed by 
Hu-Wen Administration tends to reverse the 1978’s Reform and Open policy in 2005. It 
emphasizes reduction in pollution and improving the environment by increasing taxes and 
controls over the heavy industry sector. In the rural area, the 2600 year-old tax on 
agricultural land was terminated in 2006, and this change improved farmers’ incomes and 
productivity to some extent. In the urban area, the most important policy is the 
implementation of National Minimum Wage in 2004.  
The following (table 2.3) presents a summary of 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 per capita by each province, 
in 1994, 2004, and 2015. The last row reports the standard deviation of per capita income 
across provinces divided by the mean of per capita income in these years. The higher values 
of actual data means the positive spatial effect, and it further verifies that the convergence of 
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per capita income could be underestimated using the actual data without considering the 
spatial effect. We can see that inequality across provinces decreased from 1994 to 2015 in 
both actual data (decrease by 35% in total, 6% from 1994 to 2004 and 31% from 2004 to 
2015) and filtered data (decrease by 33% in total, 9% from 1994 to 2004 and 27% from 2004 
to 2015). These data also confirm that the variation decreased dramatically in the recent 
period relative to the earlier period. 
The middle columns (of Table 2.3) report the net migrant inflow rate. Obviously, 
most coastal regions have net inflow migration, the other interior regions have net outflow. 
The most remarkable province is Guangdong, which has 19.6% of net migration during 
1990-1995 and 27% during 2000-2005. With the highest net population change, per capita 
income of Guangdong is also among the highest in 1994 and the growth rate is among the 
lowest during 1994-2015 (approaching the steady state). This provides one piece of 
information supporting the hypothesis that provinces with higher net migrants have higher 
convergence.  
The next two columns of Table 2.3 provide information on average number of years 
of schooling completed. The average schooling of adults in Beijing is 10.52 years in 1994, 
and it is the highest among all provinces. Beijing only grow 18% in twenty-one years and is 
among the provinces having the lowest growth in per capita income. The last column is 
agricultural labor force. Shanghai has only 11.9% agricultural workers, and this city has the 
lowest growth rate (14%) during the period, which is one example of a region with lower 
agricultural activates have a higher income convergence.  
The last columns of Table 2.3 report the annual growth rate of per capita income. 
Compared to the western or interior regions, most coastal regions are experiencing 
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decreasing and lower growth rate in the second period. Especially in Shanghai and Beijing, 
the growth rate declined from 8.5% to 4.8% and 10.3% to 6.6%, respectively. In contrast, 
Guizhou, a less-developed province in the Southwest, has an average growth rate in the first 
period of 7.0%, but it was much faster in the second period at 15.8%. 
I group the 31 provinces into eight regions (see Figure 2.2). Obviously, with higher 
migration rates, higher education and lower agricultural industries, the coastal areas exhibit 
the decreasing variation in per capita income over 1994-2015. The provinces and cities I 
mentioned above affect per capita income growth in neighboring coastal areas.  Among 
those, the South coast (Guangdong as center) and North coast regions (Beijing as center) had 
slightly decreasing variation in income growth starting around 2004. The most remarkable is 
the East coast, the variance of per capita income decrease from 0.25 to almost 0 from 1994 to 
2015. East coast includes Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The reason is the most important 
economic center: Shanghai. Due to the reform, Shanghai became one of Asia’s center for 
commerce, which drives the improvement of surrounding Yangtze Delta metropolitan region 
(Ease coast)’s economic growth, productivity and per capita income. With the knowledge of 
regional differences, we would expect complex results in province level. 
Is it possible for all the regions converge to a steady state? From the growth rate 
change mentioned above, we would expect the less developed regions catch up with the 
developed regions because of the increasing growth rate in interior and western regions. Of 
course, the lnGDP per capita in coastal regions are higher than other regions in our sample 
period (see Figure 2.3). We could see the gap between the “winner (Ease coast)” and “loser 
(Southwest)” was decreasing over time (the lnGDP per capita decreased from 1.24 to 1) and 
the bottom four regions were catching up with the top four regions. 
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Figure 2.4 shows the scatter plot of initial per capita income against subsequent 
growth rates across provinces. In the entire period, there’s a negative correlation between 
growth and initial per capita income. For the first period, most provinces began the period 
below 6000 yuan and result in much larger variance in growth rates. The range of growth rate 
was from 6% to 15%. The outlier is Shanghai, began with 14300 yuan in 1994. In the second 
period, the negative relationship is more obviously, and the pattern is stretching out with 
more provinces in the right end. The provinces in the right tail (more than 15000 yuan in 
2004) are those with higher growth rate in the first period and they are in coastal regions (see 
table 2.3 last columns for growth rate). The growth transition from coastal regions to other 
regions proves supports convergence.  
Figure 2.5 shows the scatter plot of initial variables – net inflow rate, aglabor, 
education against annual growth rates across provinces. There are negative relationships 
between the initial net inflow rate and growth, and initial education and growth. For initial 
aglabor percentage, the relationship is not clear. To better understand the changing of net 
inflow over time, Figure 2.6 illustrates the changing relationship between the inflow 
migration and per capita income growth. In the first subperiod, the provinces with stable 
population have large variation in income growth. However, the provinces with larger 
population change (labor reallocation) have stable growth. Hence, we would not expect clear 
relationship between convergence and migration rate in the first period. In the first half of 
second period (2004-2010), the provinces with net outflow have higher growth and the 
provinces with positive net inflow have lower growth rate. This phenomenon could be 
explained by rapid inflow of low skilled migrants could slow convergence. In the second half 
the second period (2010-2015), the overall growth rate decreased from 14 percent to 7 
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percent on average but the migration scale remained the same (within around 11%). This can 
be explained by the low skilled migrants as well as the low spillover effects. 
2.6.2 Regression results for the growth convergence model 
I have data over 1994 to 2015, 21 years, but have only 31 provinces at any point in 
time. To gain more observations, I split the 21-year period into three sub-periods: 1994-2004, 
2004-2010, and 2010-2015, and then measure the regressors at the beginning of each 
subperiod: 1994, 2004, and 2010. This gives me a total of 93 observations. I first estimate the 
growth model using lnGDP only (in Table 2.4. R1). Second, I estimate the model using 
lnGDP and an interaction term between lnGDP and net-migrant inflow rate plus conditioning 
variables for Aglabor and Education (in Table 2.4. R2). Last, I estimate the model using 
lnGDP and an interaction term between lnGDP and net-migrant inflow rate only (in Table 
2.4. R3). The regression results from estimating the growth convergence model using the 
filtered data are reported in Table 2.4. 
In regression R1, the estimated coefficients for three beginning period lnGDP are 
negative, decreased from -0.006 to -0.024 (significant at 1% level), which means the 
convergence rate increased from 0.6% to around 2.4% in the second half period. In the 
second regression, R2, we include lnGDP*net inflow, Aglabor, and Edu, to see if other 
factors can affect the magnitude of the convergence rate. The estimated coefficients for 
beginning period lnGDP was only significant in period 2004-2010, which is -0.018. The 
coefficient for lnGDP*net inflow at the beginning period of 2010-2015 is significantly 
negative at 5% level. Hence, countries that have a large net-inflow migration rate tend to 
raise the rate of growth convergence slightly. Also, countries with a larger share of the labor 
force in agriculture tend to grow more slowly (significant at the 10% level). Surprising is that 
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provinces that have higher education levels at the beginning of the period also grow more 
slowly. This unexpected sign might be due to the strong positive correlation between 
,ln i tGDP  and education at the beginning of the period. In the third regression, R3, we 
exclude Aglabor and Edu, which had low t-values in R2. These estimates of the growth 
model only provide the conditional convergence in per capita income in period 2004-2010. 
However, the evidence for conditional convergence is much stronger for the second and third 
sub-period 2004-2010 and 2010-2015, where the estimate of 𝛽3 is -0.019 and 𝛽4 is -0.016, 
compared to -0.018 and -0.007 in R2. The R2 for regression R1 is 0.64, for R2 is 0.69, and 
for R3 is 0.65. Comparing three regressions, the R1 seems like the best regression. 
Table 2.4 also presents estimates of the growth convergence model using the un-
filtered data. Similar to the filtered data, the convergence rate for R1 increased from 0% to 
2.5% (significant at 1% level)  in 2004-2010 and 2.9% (significant at 1% level) in 2010-
2015; the convergence rate for R2 increased from 1.9% to 2.9% (significant at 5% level) in 
2004-2010; the convergence rate for R2 increased from 0% to 2% (significant at 5% level) in 
2004-2010 and 2.7% (significant at 1% level) in 2010-2015.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I consider the problem of convergence of per capita income in China 
which attribute to the economic reform since 1978. I found the growth convergence only 
appears in recent period. The economic growth of China can be explained by the reallocation 
of human resources from agriculture sectors to industry and service sectors. The regional 
disparities in economic development reflect the uneven process of localized industrialization 
in a geographical context. The source of growth is from the decreasing in farm jobs, higher 
liquidity of workers and investment of education.  
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The reallocation of human capital can improve the economic growth and also deepen 
the income inequality across regions. The movement only occur for workers from developing 
area to developed area (not backwards). However, the movements mean the competition with 
the local residents for the same occupation. At the new century, China intends to move into 
higher value added manufacturing and service sectors that require higher professional skills, 
the inequality would occur due to the uneven geographical allocation of these high value 
added industries and the shortage of supply of labor force for higher-end industries. In the 
next chapter, we will look at how the structural change over time contributing to the income 
disparities. Given the potential relationship between inequality and economic growth, and the 
intrinsic link between economic growth and structural change, it is interesting to look at how 
migration workers respond to the income inequality by industry. 
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Figure 2.1 Convergence over time, 1994-2015 
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Figure 2.2 Convergence over time by region, 1994-2015 
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Figure 2.3 The trend of lnGDP per capita across regions, 1994-2015 
 
  
Figure 2.4 Growth rates and initial GDP per capita 
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Figure 2.5 Growth rates and initial variable 
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Figure 2.6 Growth rates and net inflow rate for three sub-periods  
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Table 2.1 Moran’s I statistic for log of real GDP  
 
 Years Moran's I 
2015 0.1421753*** 
2014 0.1489543*** 
2013 0.1580336*** 
2012 0.1623837*** 
2011 0.1673267*** 
2010 0.1737904*** 
2009 0.1740602*** 
2008 0.1795798*** 
2007 0.1834563*** 
2006 0.1912374*** 
2005 0.1916563*** 
2004 0.1891529*** 
2003 0.1863985*** 
2002 0.1844255*** 
2001 0.1832807*** 
2000 0.1830427*** 
1999 0.1786872*** 
1998 0.1757577*** 
1997 0.1797555*** 
1996 0.180381*** 
1995 0.17373*** 
 1994 0.1600818*** 
 Table 2.2 Annual income by education level and province in 1995 (Unit: Yuan) 
 
Average of 
annual 
income 
Education 
level 
       
Province College or 
above 
Professional 
school 
Middle level 
of vocational 
school 
High 
school 
Middle 
school 
Elementary 
school 
Below 
elementary 
school 
Average 
Beijing 9659 10177 7653 7723 7778 5410 3972 8263 
Shanxi 6589 5204 5401 4556 4648 3763 2571 4893 
Liaoning 7394 6653 6594 5425 5301 4496 1934 5771 
Jiangsu 9272 8877 7543 6865 6104 5053 3452 6835 
Anhui 7226 6337 5663 5226 4866 3824 3245 5254 
Henan 7492 5650 5230 4545 4470 3998 3469 4901 
Hubei 8129 7004 6376 5858 5596 4757 3076 6128 
Guangdong 15259 14869 12631 9861 10823 7660 5355 11079 
Sichuan 8119 6617 6490 5788 5769 4705 4000 6078 
Yunnan 7095 6616 6580 5796 5794 5141 3359 6083 
Gansu 6317 5400 5223 4506 4717 4008 3056 4839 
Average 8442 7629 6829 6082 5898 4945 3566 6400 
* Data are from CHIP 1995 individual survey data. I only use the selected provinces that include both rural and urban individual’s 
information. I filtered the data so that it only included the people aged 18-65 and also exclude rural individuals who work outside the 
province in 1995. 
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 Table 2.3 lnGDP and Net Migration rate by Province 
3
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Table 2.4 Convergence Rate Pattern (t-values are in parentheses) 
 
 Filtered Data Actual Data 
  R1 R2 
 
R3 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
lnGDP94 -0.006 
(0.88) 
 
-0.014 
(0.87) 
-0.008 
(0.80) 
-0.0002 
(0.03) 
-0.019 
(1.17) 
-0.0005 
(0.06) 
lnGDP04 -0.023** 
(2.45) 
 
-0.018** 
(2.18) 
-0.019** 
(2.35) 
-0.025*** 
(3.46) 
-0.029** 
(2.27) 
-0.020** 
(2.07) 
lnGDP10 -0.024*** 
(2.71) 
 
-0.007 
(0.39) 
-0.016 
(1.08) 
-0.029*** 
(4.17) 
-0.024 
(1.60) 
-0.027*** 
(2.74) 
lnGDP94*net 
inflow94 
 
 
0.000002 
(0.03) 
 
0.00003 
(0.51) 
 -0.00004 
(0.65) 
0.000005 
(0.10) 
lnGDP04*net 
inflow04 
 -0.00005 
(0.92) 
 
-0.00006 
(1.18) 
 -0.00006 
(1.13) 
-0.00007 
(1.44) 
lnGDP10*net 
inflow10 
 -0.0001** 
(2.56) 
 
-0.00006 
(1.31) 
 -0.00007* 
(1.87) 
-0.00002 
(0.57) 
Aglabor94 
          
 -0.051 
(1.29) 
 
  -0.087* 
(1.67) 
 
Aglabor04 
 
 0.006 
(0.16) 
 
  -0.019 
(0.46) 
 
Aglabor10 
 
 -0.039* 
(1.70) 
 
  -0.057** 
(2.02) 
 
Edu94 
 
 -0.006 
(1.01) 
 
  -0.004 
(0.84) 
 
Edu04 
 
 0.001 
(0.21) 
 
  0.002 
(0.45) 
 
Edu10 
 
 -0.01*** 
(3.69) 
 
  -0.01*** 
(3.51) 
 
Constant 0.139** 
(2.40) 
0.273* 
(1.76) 
 
0.158* 
(1.80) 
0.091* 
(1.86) 
0.329* 
(1.93) 
0.094 
(1.33) 
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 
𝑅2 0.6449 0.6864 0.6520 0.6611 0.7027 0.6651 
 
Note: All variables are the initial value in each sub-period. 
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CHAPTER 3.    INCOME INEQUALITY IN CHINA BY INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
During the economic transition over the past 4 decades, income inequality in China 
kept a very clear increasing trend. Based on the original Ravallion and Chen data for the 
1981-2001 period and the latest data released by the NBSC for the period from 2003 to 2015, 
“income inequality in China substantially increased from its nadir of 28.3 points in 1983 to 
its peak of 49.1 points in 2008, then fall down slightly to 46.2 points in 2015” (R. Molero-
Simarro, 2017: p. 108). R. Molero-Simarro (2017) investigated the inequality from the 
evolution of functional distribution of income and find out the increase of capital income 
share in top income urban household and the fall in labor share link to the worsening of the 
Gini index.  
There are some literatures study the inequality in China. Khan et al. (1992) 
decompose the urban Gini index by income source based on CHIP survey data and find that 
the contributors are wage (34%) and house subsidies (24%). Meng (2004) finds that during 
the marketization of urban sectors, the increase in unemployment led to a fall in urban 
worker’s income and then reduced the inequality in the urban labor market. Shi et al. (2016) 
investigate the evolution of urban inequality from the angle of wage structure between 1995 
and 2013 and find that regional gap and inequality of human capital are major contributors to 
overall wage inequality. Ma and Li (2016) evaluate the effect of minimum wage on urban 
inequality from 1993 to 2013 and find that the increase of minimum wages had a positive 
effect on the wage levels of the low-wage group only from 2007–2013; there was no such 
effect from 1993–1995 and from 1998–2002. Song (2017) study the household consumption 
inequality in urban China over 1995-2013 using 1995, 2002 and 2013 CHIP data. She found 
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that the increase in consumption expenditure per capita increased remarkable after 2002. 
However, the consumption inequality increases over the period. She also found the inequality 
of basic food consumption is much smaller than the overall consumption and decreasing 
steadily. By contrast, clothing consumption inequality is much larger and increasing sharply 
with the time. The inequality of housing consumption is decreasing and is much larger in the 
upper half than in the lower half. In addition, the share of food expenditure decreases steadily 
to 25% as the overall consumption level moving up. The share of clothing in overall 
consumption remains about 7% over time but exhibits downward sloping. The share of 
housing consumption sharply increased to 38% in 2013. All those evidences imply the 
increase in income gap between the poor and the rich. 
In this chapter, I focus on the income variances across industry sectors instead of the 
urban- rural gaps concluded by most authors as the main factor behind increasing inequality 
in China. During the globalization and privatization, the evolution of inequality, especially 
the structural change in the labor market, deserves intensive study. First, the urbanization 
process will continue for a long time in China. The farming activities is no longer an only 
sector in the rural area. With the investment in less-developed provinces, labor-intensive 
industries are declining, and the knowledge-intensive industries emerges. The employment 
structure change will play an important role in the evolution of overall inequality in China. 
There have been some studies on China’s structural change, but few has attempted to bring 
the shift share for each industry and the evolution of income inequality together. Second, 
most existing studies focus on explaining the low return to schooling during the economic 
transition or expanding college access in recent years, but few attentions has been paid to 
associate the return to schooling with the structural change in employment. Third, the 
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inequality is based on the province level instead of the household registration system level. 
To investigate the structural change effect on income inequality, I use the CHIP data in 1988 
and 2013, to make the inequality decomposition and regressions possible. I assume the 
transition from farming to manufacturing and then to service or high skilled sectors will 
increase the overall income inequality. 
The chapter proceeds as follow. Section 2 provides some background for the 
industrial distribution, education and return to education. Section 3 introduces the data. 
Section 4 gives the decomposition of variables over time. Section5 is to investigate the 
determinations of income variances. Section 6 summarizes. 
 
3.2 Sources of Inequality and Hypothesis 
3.2.1 Industrial distribution 
Since the economic reform started in 1978, China has received a large part of 
international direct investment flows. The introduction of foreign ownership through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) pushed the economy from collective towards marketization. In 1985, 
labor mobility across areas was relaxed and local governments were mandated to accept rural 
migrants into cities as part of their non-agricultural population. In mid-1990s, several policies 
were made to encourage more high-technology and more capital intensive FDI projects. In 
1980, the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in Guangdong and 
Fujian provinces and offered special incentive policies for FDI in these SEZs. The purposes 
are to attract overseas capital and also as a showcase for the potential impacts of reform. 
While FDI in-flows were highly concentrated within these provinces, the amounts remained 
rather limited (Cheung and Lin, 2004). After 1984, Hainan Island and fourteen coastal port 
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cities across ten provinces were opened, which were essential to support an export-oriented 
strategy. The realized value of inward FDI to China reached 3.49 billion dollars in 1990. 
Since SEZs and their positive economic impacts were solely a costal endeavor, the expected 
spillover effects from coastal to inland provinces failed to materialize. In reaction to the 
widening regional gap, more broadly-based economic reforms and open door policies were 
pushed forward in the 1990s. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping adopted a new approach which turned 
away from special regimes toward more nation-wide implementation of open policies. And 
the decentralization of state control, privatization of the state sector began to accelerate. 
Since 1992 inward FDI in China has accelerated and reached the peak level of 45.5 billion 
dollars in 1998. After a drop due to the Asian crisis, FDI inflows into China surged again, so 
that “by 2010 China had accumulated FDI stock of 579 billion, well ahead of other large 
developing and transition economies” (OECD, 2016: p. 10). In 1998, all state enterprises, 
except a few large monopolies, were liquidated and sold to private investors. “China’s entry 
to the WTO in 2001 is likely to deepen China’s integration in the international segmentation 
of production processes and as such should reinforce the FDI attractiveness position of 
China” (Madariaga, 2007: p. 839).  
Thus, FDI plays a major role in transforming the Chinese economy. The role of 
foreign companies is to bring in new production and managerial technologies, together with 
local labor, to increase capital and improve the overall productivity of the economy. In 
addition, it creates employment opportunities. “Foreign firms employed around 20 million 
workers (three percent of China’s total employment) at the end of the 1990s” (Madariaga, 
2007: p. 840). Furthermore, foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) modifies China’s industrial 
structure because FDI incorporates much more equipment and technology knowledge. An 
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important difference in industrial structure between FIEs and domestic firms is that FIEs are 
relatively more concentrated in the newly developing and fast-growing industries such as 
information technology and electronic equipment. By contrast, domestic firms are more 
present in the conventional basic capital-intensive and large-scale industries.  
As mentioned above, the direction of FDI is encouraged by exogenous geographical 
and political factors. The SEZs were attracting more foreign investment enterprises ahead of 
other regions because of their accessibility to port infrastructures and foreign markets. Hence, 
I assume that the labor market structural change caused by the economic policies (labor force 
moving from low-skilled sectors to high-skilled sectors) would cause the income inequality. I 
would expect the more opened (coastal) provinces had more concentration in manufacturing 
industries at the beginning of reform and then transit to service sectors. The other regions had 
more farming activities at the beginning of reform will transit to conventional industry 
sectors. Overall, the different speed of economic reform across provinces could result in the 
income inequality. 
 
3.2.2 Human capital investment 
The geographical dispersion of China’s investment in human capital is large. As 
shown in Table 3.1, the proportion of population with more than twelve years schooling (at 
least some college degree) was 4% in 2000 and had risen to 10% in 2010, this is due to the 
sharp increase in the enrollment and public funding for college students starting in 1999. The 
proportion of population with high school degree was 13% in 2000 and had risen to only 
15% in 2010. The proportion of individuals who had at least a high school education was 
approximately 31% in coastal region, 27% in the northeast, 24% in the interior regions, but 
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19% in the west in 2010. The Chinese government made a law for nine-years of compulsory 
education (six years of primary education plus three years of secondary education) in 1986. 
The ratio of high school enrollment (three years later) to middle school enrollment increased 
from 26% in 2000 to only 51% in 2015 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, Various 
Years), which means only one of two children can get into high school if we assume the 
compulsory education applied to all children. In 2015 the high school enrollment rate is 
approximately 58%, which means there are 7% of students don’t even graduate from middle 
school.  
The Chinese government and society appear to have failed to keep enough of the 
country’s young people in school during the recent decades of economic growth. The low 
rate of high school attendance can be attributed to high and rising costs. Academic high 
school tuition fees in China are not free and are among the highest in the world (Liu et al. 
2009). College tuition fees also are burdensome for students from poor rural areas and they 
often do not qualify for need-based financial aid. More importantly, rural families encourage 
poor exam performance students to drop out from school because of high opportunity cost 
from staying in school. The parents would suggest their children to find jobs in cities because 
of increasing demand and wages of low-skills workers in urban area. Another thoughts are 
related to the poor teaching quality in the rural area. The annual college entrance exam 
(commonly known as “Gaokao”) is the only way for entrance into almost all higher 
education institutions at the undergraduate level. It is usually taken by students in their last 
year of high school. By the time students are ready to take the exam, most of rural students 
have dropped out of the system. Since it is based on test scores only, the remaining students 
in the rural area are not competitive in this exam compared to the urban students. In addition, 
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major cities like Beijing and Shanghai are given higher quotas for admittance to college 
because the educational resources are not distributed evenly across China. Hence, the rural 
students are being discriminated in higher education. And that’s why they choose to drop out 
of school. In the short run, drop-out students can gain from migration to cities earlier than 
other students stay in school. In the long run, as too many people drop out of school too soon 
and the low-skilled jobs that may have been plentiful, the migrant workers without secondary 
skills must struggle in the cities.  
Table 3.2 shows the schooling gap between urban and rural required by each 
occupation for the young generation aged 25-35 in 2013 and the average schooling for all 
individuals in 1988. The education gap between urban residents and rural residents varies 
between 1.4 to 3.9 years across industries. Only the sectors require higher skills (ie., IT, 
Financial industry, Education) have slightly less education gap. The last column shows the 
average schooling in 1988. Since the compulsory education start after 1986, the young 
generation’s average schooling in 2013 can roughly reflect the results of this policy. We 
could see that the agriculture sectors gain from this policy and the education increased by 3.2 
years for rural workers and 5.9 years for urban workers compared to the average schooling in 
1988. For other sectors, the improvement in schooling are subtle in rural area. In contrast, the 
education level in urban areas have increased more than that in rural area in all sectors, which 
implies the higher human capital investment in more developed regions. Since we assume a 
positive relationship between education and wage, I assume the provinces with more 
percentage of rural residents have lower education level and less developed. 
Human capital has a direct role in production through the generation of worker skills. 
Fleisher and Chen (1996) find the regional inequality of investment in Chinese higher 
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education can explain the high and rising regional income inequality. Therefore, I assume 
that the discrepancy of education obtained will result in regional inequality in China.  
 
3.2.3 Return to schooling 
  Campos et al. (2016) analyzes the impact of education on income inequality 
between ethnic minorities and Han in China by using the data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1993–2011. They found that there exists 
significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities but the return to 
education for ethnic minorities is high, which implies that a portion of the income gap can be 
overcome with additional education. They found that in general one additional year of 
education will increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3–28% and in particular by 
13.5–14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, by 10.4–14% for ethnic minorities 
with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic minorities with rural household 
registration. 
Belskaya et al.(2014) evaluates whether the expansion of higher education is 
economically worthwhile based on a recent surge in the number of campuses and college 
graduates in Russia. They find that college expansion attracts individuals with lower returns 
to college, but the returns for marginal students who are directly affected by college 
expansion vary considerably depending on the scale of expansion and the type of location 
where new campuses are opened. Marginal individuals in smaller cities and locations without 
college campuses receive the largest benefits from new campuses.  
In China, higher education expanded almost six-fold in the decade 1988-2008. J. 
Knight et al. (2017) shows that the share of higher education graduates in total employment 
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rose by 8 percentage points, but the graduate unemployment rate rose by only 1.4 percentage 
points. This implies that the higher education wage premium has been depressed by supply 
shock. Compared to high school leavers, the average hourly wage for the entry cohort of 
higher education graduates and university graduates fall over the five years. There’s the same 
pattern in the proportion of the “good job” for the entry cohort of higher education graduates 
and university graduates. In addition, the unemployment rate increased only for these 
cohorts. 
Keng, Lin and Orazem (2017) also investigated the expansion of college access and 
education quality on income inequality in Taiwan. They found that increasing college access 
alone will not lower inequality, the variance of wage income increased by 7 percent due to 
the surge of weakly- trained college graduates. As a result, firms substitute more experienced 
college-trained workers for their less experienced counterparts, leading to falling college 
premia for young college graduates. Hence, the college-high school wage gaps of young and 
older workers have moved in polarizing directions.  
In this chapter, I will investigate if the structural change can be associated with rising 
wage premium for higher education. As mentioned above, the employment structures in 
China are shifting from labor-intensive industries to knowledge-intensive industries. The 
increasing labor demand of technology and high-skilled sectors during the globalization 
favor workers with higher education. Meanwhile, the expansion of college access and lower 
education quality can also reduce the advantages of college graduates. As suggested by 
Belskaya, the location of workers does make a difference. I assume the provinces with more 
universities (more college graduates) but lower concentration in higher-skilled industries will 
have lower wage premium because of the supply shock. To specify the structural change on 
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income across provinces, I will estimate return to schooling using sectors and provinces as 
income determinants.  
3.3 Data Description 
Individual data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 2013 and CHIP 
1988) are employed in this chapter to compare the provincial income inequality between 
1988 and 2013. This survey contains fourteen provinces in common of two databases. 
Working individual aged 18-65 are used as samples. The individual employment rate across 
industry sectors is used to summarize the density of industries in each province. In addition, 
the annual income and schooling years for each individual are used to estimate the return to 
schooling. Hence, the provincial average income is computed by the average annual income 
for each sector and then summarized by the labor share of sectors.  
 
3.4 Variables Decomposition 
3.4.1 Decomposition of shift employment share of sectors 
Table 3.3 shows the share of labor by industry in 1988, 2002 and 2013. We can see 
that the good-producing industries decreased substantially from 74% in 1988 to 49% in 2002, 
then decrease to 44% in 2013. The decline trend mainly caused by the decrease in 
agricultural sector (from 45% in 1988 to 4% in 2013). Since economic reform, the labor 
market in China has undergone major structural change. The most significant shift share is 
the farming to nonfarming transition. Compared to other OECD countries, China has 
relatively higher deduction in the employment rate in the agriculture sector (China decreased 
by 20% and the average OECD members decreased by 3% between 1999 and 2013 (Word 
bank, 2017)).  
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As opposed to the decline trend of other OECD countries, the employment rate in 
industry sector in China increased since 1999 and exceed the average OECD level at 2009 
then stay stable at 24% after 2010 (Word bank, 2017). From CHIP survey (in Table 3.3), the 
construction sector increased by 12%. Since China enter WTO in 2001, the labor share in 
manufacturing increased from 24% in 1988 to 29% in 2002 but decreased to 22% in 2013 
because of the increase in labor cost compared to other Asian countries. During the same 
time, the labor share of manufacturing in United States decreased slightly from 100 points in 
1988 to 92 points in 2002, then decrease sharply to 67 points in 2013 (US bureau of Labor 
Statistics) as a result of competition from globalization.  
Manufacturing is an important driver for economic growth in China, and China’s 
exports depends on continued exports of manufacturing products. Most provinces have the 
manufacturing sector as its major sector. As suggested by R. Molero-Simarro (2017), the 
stagnating agricultural prices pushed the increasing in rural-urban migration while the hukou 
system and privatizations caused industrial wages to increase well below labor productivity, 
causing the fall in medium and low-income families’ available earnings in the urban area 
(given the high relevance of labor share and disposable income). 
The service-providing industries increased sharply from 26% in 1988 to 51% in 2002, 
then continue to increase to 56% in 2013. Trade, Restaurants & Catering, Materials Supply 
and Marketing sectors increased from 8% in 1988 to 13% in 2002 and reach 17% in 2013. 
Personal Service and Counseling Services increased from 1% to 7% in 2002 and reach 10% 
in 2013. In addition, there are three new industries: IT, computer service and software; 
Leasing and business services; and Production and Supply of Electricity gas and water, 
which account for 6% of the labor share. Although it’s still far away from other OECD 
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countries, China has higher growth in service sectors (from 26% in 1991 to 45% in 2013 
(Word bank, 2017)).  
In the United States, the share of middle skilled jobs (manufacturing, operatives-
assemblers, secretarial, clerical) decreased by 10% at the same time as the low skilled (local 
food and personal services) and high skilled jobs (managers, professionals) were increasing 
during 2002-2014 (Huffman, 2017). If China’s structural change follow western country’s 
change pattern, the employment in manufacturing sectors will continue to decrease. High-
skilled sectors would replace the low-end jobs, the workers with less skills were most likely 
get laid off and lost the earning power.  
The modern information technology and software automation have resulted in 
computerization of routine tasks and rapid displacement of labor in repetitive production and 
monitoring tasks. For example, online trading platform could replace the traditional bank 
teller; online shopping and Virtual Reality could reduce the physical stores and the 
automation could replace the manufacturing workers.  
Hence, the low-skilled labor force needed by physical retail trading, residential 
service and banking sectors will be declining. Instead, these conventional industries require 
more high-skilled managerial workers to control the software or information technology. 
This also implies the difficulty for migrants from less-developed provinces or from rural 
originally participating in lower-skilled job to move to higher-skilled job in cities. Hence, the 
workers need to be upskilled to adapt themselves to the new environment.  
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Next, I will decompose the shift share into two parts to evaluate the impact of 
structure change on employment: 
∆𝐸 =   ∑ ∆𝐸𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
= ∑ 𝜃𝑗(∑ ∆𝐸𝑗𝑝𝐸𝑝
𝑝
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑝∆𝐸𝑝
𝑝
) 
Where 𝐸𝑝 is the proportion of all employment in province 𝑝; 𝐸𝑗𝑝  is the proportion of 
employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝; 𝐸𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in total 
employment; 𝜃𝑗  are the proportion of all country employment in sector j, where ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 = 1 . 
The first term (within term) is the change in sector share due to growing share of this 
sector in employment within provinces, holding relative provincial demand for labor fixed 
(ie, individual provinces have increased their demand for this sector compared to other 
provinces, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in shares due to changes in 
employment between provinces, holding the mix of sectors within each province fixed (ie, 
sector share rises because provinces that hire this sector are growing).  
Table 3.4 displays the shift share results. The changes in share across sectors are 
mainly due to the within-term changes (decrease by 17%). On average, the weighted average 
labor share of goods-producing industries decreased by 25% while the service-producing 
industries increased by 8%. Hence, we can conclude that the structural transition is from 
primary industry to secondary and tertiary industries.  
Bai and Qian (2010) also used the Solow (1958) decomposition method to quantify 
the two forces driving the movement in the aggregate labor share (of national income) during 
1978 and 2007 in China: structural transformation (estimated by value-added share change of 
each sector, use the income approach) and labor share changes within sectors. They found the 
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two effects are both negative and together drive down aggregate labor share of 5.48 
percentage points from 1995 to 2003. They specified that “structural transformation from 
agriculture to non-agriculture sectors has shown negative impact on aggregate labor share 
since the mid-1980. Industry takes the major role in the within-sector change effect on 
aggregate labor share” (op.cit.: 651). They also questioned the China’s national income 
accounts as the “NBS counts mixed income of rural household from agriculture as labor 
compensation” and “overstated the labor share in agriculture”.  
In this chapter, I did not use income approach to weight the sector share and the 
sector share is calculated by the employment rate across provinces. My results verified that 
the labor share decrease in agricultural sectors drive down the aggregate labor share. The 
within-sector change effect dominates the aggregate changes. The employment share transit 
from agricultural sector to construction and service sectors can explain the aggregate labor 
change. 
3.4.2 Decomposition of change in income across provinces 
The decomposition model displays as follows to evaluate the income decomposition 
across provinces: 
∆lny = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑝
(∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝) = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑝
(∑ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗1988
𝑗
+ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑗
) 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝 is the average income in province 𝑝; 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗 is the average income in sector 𝑗 in 
province 𝑝; 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝; 𝜃𝑝 are the 
proportion of all country employment in province p, where ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 = 1 . 
The first term (within term) is the change in average income due to raised income 
level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, individual 
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sectors have increased their remuneration for employees compared to other sectors, even if 
they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in average income due to changes in 
employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of wage within each sector fixed (ie, 
income rises because sectors that offer higher remuneration are growing).  
Table 3.5 displays the change in average income for the decomposition across 
provinces between 1988 and 2013. Compared to 1988, the average income grows by 3.06. 
89% of the income increase in China are due to the within-term changes. Due to the 
increased labor productivity and technology improvement after economic reform, the 
companies are willing to offer higher remunerations. The shift share can also contribute to 
11% of the income increase. The employees in Chongqin and Sichuan are more likely to be 
affected by the sector change. Or we can say the provinces with more farming to nonfarming 
transition have higher between term effects. From the province perspective, most provinces 
have the income growth more than 3. Only Liaoning, Guangdong, Sichuan and Yunnan 
provinces have income growth less than 3. Among these provinces, Yunnan (2.41) has the 
lowest income growth and Jiangsu (3.37) has the highest income growth.  
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3.4.3 Decomposition of change in average schooling across provinces 
The decomposition model displays as follows to evaluate the change in average 
schooling across provinces: 
∆Edu = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑝
(∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝) = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑝
(∑ ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗1988
𝑗
+ ∑ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗2013∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑗
) 
Where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝 is the average schooling in province 𝑝; 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗 is the average schooling in sector 
𝑗 in province 𝑝; 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝; 𝜃𝑝 are the 
proportion of all country employment in province p, where ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 = 1 .Here, the 𝜃𝑝 should 
be the same as in section 3.4.2. 
The first term (within term) is the change in average education due to raised requirement 
for education level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, 
individual sectors have increased their demand for higher educated employees compared to 
other sectors, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in average education due to changes in 
employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of skills within each sector fixed (ie, 
education rises because sectors that hire higher educated employees are growing).  
Table 3.6 displays the change in average education for the decomposition across 
provinces between 1988 and 2013. Compared to 1988, the average education grows by 1.79 
years. The within-sector and between sector components are almost equally responsible for 
the increase in education.  The education change in Liaoning, Anhui, Hubei and Hunan are 
more likely to be affected by the sector shift share. The education change in Beijing, Henan 
and Gansu are more likely to be affected by the higher skills requirements within sectors. 
Among these provinces, Shanxi (0.27 years) has the lowest education improvement and 
50 
Chongqin (4.08 years) has the highest education improvement. However, the average income 
improved by 3.03 in Shanxi and 3.04 in Chongqin, which means the return to schooling are 
quite different across provinces. 
Table 3.7 represents the average schooling and lny by sectors. Geological 
Prospecting, Scientific and Technical Services sector (13.96 years in 2013, 10.52 years in 
1988) and Finance sectors (13.80 years in 2013, 10.65 years in 1988) have the relatively 
higher average schooling. This is very low education requirement compared to other 
countries. The samples used to calculate the average education are all adults aged 18-65. 
During Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the higher education system was almost shut down. 
Until late 1977, the national higher education entrance examination was officially resumed 
but less than 1% of Chinese people had attended higher education. From the CHIP 2013 
database, the average education level for older workers (aged 50-65) is around two years 
lower than the young workers (aged 18-35). It’s surprised that the average education level 
only increased by 2 years within almost two generations. From the return to schooling 
perspective, the sector with highest education level does not imply the highest wage. In 
addition, the return to schooling is not distributed equally across industries. From table 3.7, 
we could roughly estimate the Health, sports and social welfare sector has the highest return 
to schooling, Transport, communications, post and telecommunications sector has the lowest 
return to schooling between 1988 and 2013. Hence, in the following chapter, I will estimate 
the return to schooling in 1998 and 2013, separately and further investigate the impact of (1) 
changes in human capital investment (estimated by schooling), (2) changes in return to 
human capital and (3) changes in densities of each industry sectors (structural change) on 
income variances. 
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3.5 Variance Decomposition Approach 
We are interested in monitoring how the changing shares of industry sectors 
composition contribute to the income inequality.  Keng and Orazem (2017) uses the variance 
decomposition approach to decompose the changing variance of household income into three 
components: changing group population share, changing within-group income variance, and 
changing between-group income variance. In this chapter, I am going to use the same method 
to decompose the changing variance of individual income into three components: changing 
employment share of each sector, changing within-sector income variance, and changing 
between-sector income variance.  The changing variance is based on two years: (1) 1988: in 
the beginning period of reform and increased basic education investment, FDI mainly in 
coastal/SEZ area; and (2) 2013: 35 years after the economic reform and surge of high-
knowledge/tech intensive industries. 
The decomposition for the total variance in income 𝜎𝑌
2 is given as (suggested by Keng 
and Orazem, 2017):   
𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌
2 = ∑ 𝜃𝑝 ∗ {∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑝
2𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝(𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿?)
2
}𝑘𝑗=1𝑝      
where 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑝
2  is the within sector j variance of individual income in province p; 𝛼𝑗𝑝 is the 
sector j employment share of all labor force in province p; 𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 is the mean individual 
income for sector j in province p; and 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿? is the overall mean individual income in province 
p.  The first term shows how much of the variance is due to inequality within sectors while 
the second term denotes how much of the income variance is due to inequality between 
sectors. The country-level variance 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌
2  is the weighted average using employment 
proportion as weights: 𝜃𝑝.  
 
52 
Table 3.8 reports the average values for the decomposition across provinces in 1988 
and 2013.  Over twenty-five years, the overall individual income variance increased 4 times 
from 0.16 to 0.64.  The within-sector variance components increased more than 5 times and 
its share in variance jumped from 64% to 91%. However, the between sector component 
remain at 0.06. Hence, the income variances within the industry sectors is responsible for the 
increase in individual income variance. As suggested by R. Molero-Simarro (2017), the 
significant business profit income from both state and private enterprises have been 
channeled into top 10% households’ income. It’s understandable that the within-sector 
income variance worsened. For most province, we can also see the remarkable increase in 
income variance result from within-sector component, for example, Hubei, Hunan, 
Chongqin, Sichuan and Gansu. Hunan, Sichuan and Gansu are less developed provinces and 
mix of minorities and Han. Hence, the income inequality worsened in these areas. In 
addition, the between sector variance can also explain the increase in individual variance in 
some provinces including Beijing and Guangdong. As developed provinces/metropolis that 
consistent of more urban residents, more educated workers (in Beijing) and technical skilled 
workers (in Guangdong) can also explain the income inequality. 
To illustrate the role of education effect, return to schooling effect and the sector 
share change on the increased income variances between 1988 and 2013, we set 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  in 1988 
as the base case and change one variable each time to separate the three factors.  First, we 
specify a baseline equation for the wage as a function of education, and control for industry 
sector and province only.  
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Since I emphasis the effect of structural change on income, other control variables 
will be investigated in the next chapter. Province level income can be summarized as the 
product of share of industry sectors and sector level income. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒                              (a) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑖                                                                      (b) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅𝑗                                                                    (c) 
In equation (a), 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the log of annual income for individual 𝑖, in sector 𝑗, year 𝑡 and 
province 𝑝. 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the schooling years completed for individual 𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is return to 
schooling. 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 are both dummy variables. In Eq. (c), 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑡 is the average 
income in province 𝑝. 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the share of industries 𝑗 in province 𝑝 and 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the average 
income for n individuals in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. The baseline equations enable us to 
measure provincial income by estimating three variables: 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡. We can 
make variation on one variable use different data after fixing all other variables to get the 
different results. 
Education effect Method: To demonstrate the role of the education effect on the income 
variance, we start from the actual individual income in 1988 and then construct 
counterfactual series of income use the individual schooling data from CHIP 2013 database 
instead of the schooling data in 1988 to estimate the individual income variances. First, 
estimate the regression coefficients (𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ , 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂  and 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ) in equation (a11) using 
CHIP 1988 individual survey data. Second, apply these coefficients to equation (a12) to 
estimate 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  using CHIP 2013 individual schooling data for each individual in 2013. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅could be computed by average 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  for n individuals in industry sector 𝑗 in 
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province 𝑝 (b1). By using the 1988’s industry share 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 to equation (c1), we can get the 
estimated average income in province 𝑝.  (CHIP 2013 has three new industry sectors: IT, 
computer service and software; Leasing and business services; Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water. Individuals from new industries in 2013 are excluded in computing 
the average income because we only have return to education 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 for the industries 
existing in 1998.) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a11) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒         (a12) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛𝑝𝑗2013
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂𝑖                                                                             (b1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅𝑗                                                                              (c1) 
Return to schooling Method: Similarly, we construct counterfactual series of income using 
the estimated return to schooling from CHIP 2013 database to estimate the individual income 
variances. First, estimate the regression coefficients in equation (a21) using CHIP 2013 
individual survey data. Second, apply these coefficients to equation (a22) to estimate 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  using CHIP 1988 individual schooling data for each individual in 1988. Since the 
share of industries in each province are set to be unchanged, we could average  𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  for 
𝑛𝑝 individuals in province 𝑝 to calculate the province level income (equation c2).  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a21) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a22) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛𝑝1988
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂𝑖                                                                               (c2) 
Sector share Method: To demonstrate the share change effect, we construct the 
counterfactual income variance by altering the sector employment share to be 𝛼𝑗𝑝 in 2013. 
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That is, change 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 to be 𝛼𝑝𝑗2013 in equation (c), holding other variables (e.g. 
𝛽, 𝑒𝑑𝑢, 𝛾, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝛿) unchanged. 
In Table 3.8, the actual individual income variance has grown by 4 times from 0.16 to 
0.64 between 1988 and 2013.  In Table 3.9, the first counterfactual series (Education effect) 
suggests that the individual income variance would have decreased to 0.03 if the only factor 
changed is average schooling. Although all provinces have improved their education 
investment, the return to education in 1988 is only 0.5%. The low return to schooling 
explains the low volatility of individual income. In addition, the variance of individual 
education decreased from 16.87 in 1988 to 11.54 in 2013. The increased education 
investment in less-developed areas can also contribute the lower income variances. From the 
province perspective, Shandong, Chonqin and Sichuan have higher income variance than 
1988. These three provinces have relatively higher education improvement than other 
provinces. However, the between-sector variation increased because almost all the labor 
force goes to farming in 1988, which resulted in lower province level income relative to 
sector level income (higher 𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿?).  The second counterfactual series (Return to 
schooling) indicates that the individual income variance would have grown to 0.23 if the only 
factor changed is return to schooling. The overall return to schooling jumps to 7.1% in 2013. 
The higher income variances compared to 1988 are mainly due to the higher education 
variance in 1988 and higher return to schooling in 2013. And the third counterfactual series 
(Sector share) indicates that the individual income variance would have grown to 1.10 if the 
only factor changed is the share. Since we are using the sector share in 2013, the provinces 
with large movements from farming to nonfarming sectors during 1988 to 2013 will have 
large income variation because they are dominated by between sector variation (for example, 
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Shandong has 88% decrease in agricultural but 5.78 increase in income variance, and Hunan 
has 87% decrease in agricultural but 3.95 increase in income variance). Hence, from the 
direction of variance movements we could conclude that the return to schooling and share 
change are two key reasons for the increased income variance in 2013.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In recent decades China has experienced remarkably high and sustained economic 
growth rate. High growth rate depends on the industrial revolution from farming to 
nonfarming sectors, improvements in educational attainment and return on schooling. 
Although the return to schooling increased from 0.5% in 1988 to 7.1% in 2013, the average 
schooling years only increased by 1.8 years to 9.8 years in 2013. The increase in return to 
schooling can be explained by the economic transformation from labor intensive sectors to 
knowledge intensive sectors and rapid economic growth. Although the nine-year compulsory 
schooling policy improved the average schooling, the low requirement only eliminate 
illiteracy and far away from the quality-oriented education. If the increase in education 
investment could be matched with the increase in return to schooling, the income growth 
would be faster. 
From the individual level perspective, the income inequality is widening since the 
economic transition in what was already considered to be one of the most unequal economies 
in the world. The individual level income variance increased from 0.16 in 1988 to 0.64 in 
2013. The inequality decomposition suggests that it is mainly attribute to the within-sector 
income gap. In addition, I am trying to use three effects: schooling, return to schooling and 
employment share change to explain the inequality. From the movement of the variance, we 
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found that the increased return to schooling and shift share from agricultural sectors to other 
sectors can mainly contribute to the increase in inequality. 
Since the returns to education in China has been lower and rising less rapidly than in 
other transition economics, I will discuss the trend of return to schooling and the factors that 
would contribute to the slow trend in the next chapter.
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Table 3.1 Education investment by provinces 
 2010 2000 
Province <9 years 10-12 years >12 years <9 years 10-12 years >12 years 
Liaoning 72% 16% 12% 80% 13% 7% 
Jilin 72% 18% 10% 79% 16% 5% 
Heilongjiang 75% 15% 10% 80% 15% 5% 
Beijing 45% 22% 33% 58% 24% 18% 
Tianjin 60% 22% 18% 69% 22% 9% 
Hebei 78% 14% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
Shandong 76% 15% 9% 85% 11% 4% 
Shanghai 55% 22% 23% 65% 24% 11% 
Jiangsu 71% 18% 11% 82% 14% 4% 
Zhejiang 76% 14% 10% 85% 12% 3% 
Fujian 76% 15% 9% 86% 11% 3% 
Guangdong 72% 19% 9% 82% 14% 4% 
Hainan 75% 17% 8% 83% 14% 3% 
Shanxi 74% 17% 9% 84% 12% 4% 
Inner Mongolia 73% 16% 11% 81% 15% 4% 
Henan 78% 15% 7% 86% 11% 3% 
Shaanxi 72% 17% 11% 82% 13% 5% 
Anhui 81% 12% 7% 89% 9% 2% 
Jiangxi 79% 13% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
Hubei 72% 18% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
Hunan 75% 17% 8% 85% 12% 3% 
Guangxi 81% 12% 7% 87% 10% 3% 
Chongqin 77% 14% 9% 88% 9% 3% 
Sichuan 81% 12% 7% 89% 8% 3% 
Guizhou 86% 8% 6% 91% 7% 2% 
Yunnan 85% 9% 6% 90% 8% 2% 
Tibet 89% 5% 6% 95% 4% 1% 
Gansu 78% 14% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
Qinghai 79% 12% 9% 85% 11% 4% 
Ningxia 76% 14% 10% 84% 12% 4% 
Xinjiang 76% 12% 12% 81% 13% 6% 
Average 75% 15% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
Northeast 73% 16% 11% 80% 14% 6% 
North coast 65% 18% 17% 74% 18% 8% 
East coast 68% 17% 15% 77% 17% 6% 
South Coast 75% 16% 9% 83% 13% 4% 
Huanghe middle 74% 16% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
Changjiang 
middle 
77% 15% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
Southwest 82% 11% 7% 89% 8% 3% 
Northwest 80% 11% 9% 86% 10% 4% 
* Data is from 2010 and 2000 China Population Census.
 Table 3.2 Schooling years by industries 
 
   Schooling years for aged 25-35 in 2013 1988 
 Sectors Urban Rural Urban-Rural All individuals 
Goods-Producing 
Industries 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
11.7 9 2.7 5.8 
Construction 12.9 9.1 3.9 8.7 
Manufacturing 12.4 9.5 3 9.3 
Mining 11.9 9.6 2.3 10 
Service-Providing 
Industries 
Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
12 9.9 2.1 9.4 
Personal Services and 
Counseling Services 
11.8 9.5 2.3 8.6 
Education, Culture, and Art 15 13 1.9 12 
Party, Government, or Social 
Organs 
14.5 11.8 2.6 11.2 
Finance, Insurance 15 13.3 1.7 11.4 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 13.7 12.3 1.4 10 
Health, Sports, and Social 
Welfare 
14.8 11.7 3.1 11.9 
Transport, Communications, 
Post and Telecommunications  
12.4 9.7 2.7 9.6 
Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical 
Services 
15.9 13.2 2.7 12.8 
IT, computer service and 
software 
14.3 12.3 1.9 N/A 
Leasing and business services 12.2 10.1 2.2 N/A 
Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water 
14 10 3.9 N/A 
 China 13.2 9.9 3.3 8.2 
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Table 3.3 Share of labor by industry, 1988, 2002 and 2013 
 Sectors 2013 2002 1988 
Goods-Producing Industries Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
4% 7% 45% 
Construction 15% 11% 3% 
Manufacturing 22% 29% 24% 
Mining 3% 2% 2% 
Sum 44% 49% 74% 
Service-Providing Industries Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
17% 13% 8% 
Personal Services and 
Counseling Services 
10% 7% 1% 
Education, Culture, and Art 5% 6% 4% 
Party, Government, or Social 
Organs 
6% 8% 5% 
Finance, Insurance 1% 2% 1% 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 2% 1% 1% 
Health, Sports, and Social 
Welfare 
3% 3% 2% 
Transport, Communications, 
Post and Telecommunications 
7% 7% 4% 
Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical 
Services 
0% 1% 2% 
IT, computer service and 
software 
2% 0% 0% 
Leasing and business services 2% 0% 0% 
Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water 
2% 2% 0% 
 Sum 56% 51% 26% 
 
 
6
0
 
  
 
Table 3.4 Decomposition of the shift share between 1988 and 2013 
 
  Within Between Sum 
 Sectors ∑ ∆𝐸𝑗𝑝𝐸𝑝
𝑝
 ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑝∆𝐸𝑝
𝑝
 ∆𝐸𝑗 
Goods-Producing Industries Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
-41% 0% -41% 
Construction 12% 0% 12% 
Manufacturing -2% -1% -3% 
Mining 1% 0% 1% 
Average -25% 0% -25% 
Service-Providing Industries Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
9% 0% 9% 
Personal Services and Counseling 
Services 
9% 0% 9% 
Transport, Communications, Post and 
Telecommunications  
3% 0% 3% 
IT, computer service and software 2% 0% 2% 
Leasing and business services 2% 0% 2% 
Production and Supply of Electricity 
gas and water 
2% 0% 2% 
Others* 4% 0% 4% 
Average 8% 0% 8% 
 China -17% 0% -17% 
*Others include Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Public Utilities, Health, Sports, and Social Welfare, Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical Services, Education, Culture, and Art, Party, Government, or Social Organs sectors. These sectors have very 
small (~1%) shift share change. 
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Table 3.5 Decomposition of the lny change between 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis) 
 
 Within Between Sum 
Province ∑ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗1988
𝑗
 ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑗
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝 
Beijing 3.27 (99%) 0.04 (1%) 3.31 
Shanxi 2.91 (96%) 0.13 (4%) 3.03 
Liaoning 2.65 (90%) 0.29 (10%) 2.93 
Jiangsu 3.19 (95%) 0.18 (5%) 3.37 
Anhui 3.01 (93%) 0.22 (7%) 3.22 
Shandong 2.64 (84%) 0.49 (16%) 3.13 
Henan 2.85 (94%) 0.19 (6%) 3.03 
Hubei 2.85 (88%) 0.38 (12%) 3.23 
Hunan 2.58 (83%) 0.54 (17%) 3.13 
Guangdong 2.69 (96%) 0.12 (4%) 2.81 
Chongqin 1.97 (65%) 1.07 (35%) 3.04 
Sichuan 1.97 (70%) 0.85 (30%) 2.82 
Yunnan 2.21 (92%) 0.19 (8%) 2.41 
Gansu 3.08 (93%) 0.24 (7%) 3.33 
China 2.73 (89%) 0.33 (11%) 3.06 
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Table 3.6 Decomposition of the schooling change between 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis) 
 
 Within Between Sum 
Provinces ∑ ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗1988
𝑗
 ∑ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗2013∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑗
 ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝 
Beijing 1.67 (89%) 0.20 (11%) 1.87 
Shanxi 0.14 (51%) 0.13 (49%) 0.27 
Liaoning 0.07 (12%) 0.47 (88%) 0.54 
Jiangsu 0.50 (35%) 0.91 (65%) 1.41 
Anhui -0.02 (-2%) 0.86 (102%) 0.84 
Shandong 2.23 (62%) 1.36 (38%) 3.59 
Henan 0.91 (71%) 0.36 (29%) 1.27 
Hubei 0.14 (13%) 0.90 (87%) 1.04 
Hunan 0.88 (27%) 2.37 (73%) 3.25 
Guangdong 0.32 (32%) 0.66 (68%) 0.98 
Chongqin 1.66 (41%) 2.42 (59%) 4.08 
Sichuan 1.73 (53%) 1.50 (47%) 3.23 
Yunnan 1.06 (66%) 0.54 (34%) 1.60 
Gansu 1.28 (78%) 0.36 (22%) 1.64 
China 0.86 (48%) 0.93 (52%) 1.79 
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Table 3.7 Average schooling and lny by sectors in 1988 and 2013 (Percentage change are in parenthesis) 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 1988 Change 
 Sectors Schooling lny Schooling lny Schooling lny 
Goods-
Producing 
Industries 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
7.46 9.33 5.75 6.93 1.70 (30%) 2.40 (35%) 
Construction 8.05 9.96 8.91 7.18 -0.85 (-10%) 2.77 (39%) 
Manufacturing 9.42 10.12 9.63 7.08 -0.21 (-2%) 3.04 (43%) 
Mining 9.15 10.21 9.53 7.12 -0.38 (-4%) 3.09 (43%) 
Average 8.76 10.00 7.24 6.99 1.52 3.01 
Service-
Providing 
Industries 
Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
9.4 10 9.74 7.09 -0.34 (-3%) 2.91 (41%) 
Personal Services and Counseling 
Services 
9.29 9.89 8.08 7.05 1.21 (15%) 2.83 (40%) 
Education, Culture, and Art 13.25 10.33 12.42 7.17 0.83 (7%) 3.16 (44%) 
Party, Government, or Social Organs 12.41 10.2 11.59 7.17 0.81 (7%) 3.03 (42%) 
Finance, Insurance 13.8 10.65 11.69 7.04 2.10 (18%) 3.60 (51%) 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 11.37 10.26 10.12 7.03 1.25 (12%) 3.23 (46%) 
Health, Sports, and Social Welfare 12.31 10.15 11.85 7.17 0.46 (4%) 2.99 (42%) 
Transport, Communications, Post and 
Telecommunications  
9.62 10.28 9.8 7.24 -0.19 (-2%) 3.03 (42%) 
Geological Prospecting, Scientific 
and Technical Services 
13.96 10.52 12.39 7.18 1.58 (13%) 3.33 (46%) 
IT, computer service and software 13.16 10.42     
Leasing and business services 10.54 10.1     
Production and Supply of Electricity 
gas and water 
10.69 10.25     
Average 10.58 10.21 10.83 7.14 -0.25 2.98 
 China 9.81 10.07 8.24 7.01 1.57 3.06 
 Variance 11.54 0.64 16.87 0.16   
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Table 3.8 Decomposition of the Individual lny Variance: 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis) 
 Within Between Total 
 
∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑝
2
𝑘
𝑗=1
 ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝(𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿?)
2
𝑘
𝑗=1
 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  
Province 1988 2013 1988 2013 1988 2013 
Beijing 0.15 (98%) 0.51 (84%) 0.00 (2%) 0.10 (16%) 0.16 0.61 
Shanxi 0.15 (84%) 0.68 (89%) 0.03 (16%) 0.08 (11%) 0.18 0.76 
Liaoning 0.13 (91%) 0.65 (90%) 0.01 (9%) 0.07 (10%) 0.14 0.72 
Jiangsu 0.14 (83%) 0.46 (94%) 0.03 (17%) 0.03 (6%) 0.16 0.49 
Anhui 0.10 (57%) 0.57 (93%) 0.08 (43%) 0.04 (7%) 0.18 0.61 
Shandong 0.01 (53%) 0.58 (94%) 0.01 (47%) 0.04 (6%) 0.02 0.61 
Henan 0.10 (82%) 0.61 (96%) 0.02 (18%) 0.03 (4%) 0.12 0.64 
Hubei 0.08 (43%) 0.56 (89%) 0.10 (57%) 0.07 (11%) 0.18 0.63 
Hunan 0.03 (29%) 0.65 (95%) 0.07 (71%) 0.03 (5%) 0.09 0.68 
Guangdong 0.20 (97%) 0.48 (94%) 0.01 (3%) 0.03 (6%) 0.20 0.51 
Chongqin 0.01 (27%) 0.49 (88%) 0.02 (73%) 0.07 (12%) 0.03 0.56 
Sichuan 0.01 (27%) 0.69 (92%) 0.02 (73%) 0.06 (8%) 0.03 0.75 
Yunnan 0.09 (56%) 0.74 (87%) 0.07 (44%) 0.11 (13%) 0.15 0.85 
Gansu 0.14 (28%) 0.58 (87%) 0.37 (72%) 0.09 (13%) 0.51 0.67 
China 0.11 (64%) 0.58 (91%) 0.06 (36%) 0.06 (9%) 0.16 0.64 
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Table 3.9 Counterfactual Individual lny Variance decomposition across provinces (Percentage are in parenthesis) 
 
 
 
 Education effect: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  Return to schooling: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  Sector share: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  
Province Within Between Sum Within Between Sum Within Between Sum 
Beijing 0.00 (2%) 0.01 (98%) 0.01 0.04 (26%) 0.11 (74%) 0.15 0.16 (97%) 0.39 (3%) 0.16 
Shanxi 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.04 (21%) 0.15 (79%) 0.19 0.20 (88%) 0.03 (12%) 0.22 
Liaoning 0.00 (1%) 0.01 (99%) 0.01 0.03 (18%) 0.14 (82%) 0.17 0.15 (6%) 2.54 (94%) 2.70 
Jiangsu 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.05 (23%) 0.19 (77%) 0.24 0.17 (92%) 0.01 (8%) 0.18 
Anhui 0.00 (1%) 0.03 (99%) 0.03 0.06 (20%) 0.25 (80%) 0.31 0.16 (67%) 0.08 (33%) 0.24 
Shandong 0.00 (1%) 0.05 (99%) 0.05 0.08 (65%) 0.04 (35%) 0.12 0.04 (1%) 5.74 (99%) 5.78 
Henan 0.00 (1%) 0.03 (99%) 0.03 0.06 (21%) 0.22 (79%) 0.28 0.18 (86%) 0.03 (14%) 0.21 
Hubei 0.00 (1%) 0.03 (99%) 0.03 0.05 (19%) 0.21 (81%) 0.26 0.09 (59%) 0.07 (41%) 0.16 
Hunan 0.00 (1%) 0.05 (99%) 0.05 0.06 (56%) 0.04 (44%) 0.10 0.15 (4%) 3.80 (96%) 3.95 
Guangdong 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.05 (22%) 0.17 (78%) 0.21 0.23 (98%) 0.00 (2%) 0.24 
Chongqin 0.00 (1%) 0.05 (99%) 0.06 0.06 (60%) 0.04 (40%) 0.10 0.03 (1%) 3.56 (99%) 3.59 
Sichuan 0.00 (1%) 0.05 (99%) 0.05 0.06 (60%) 0.04 (40%) 0.10 0.03 (1%) 3.56 (99%) 3.59 
Yunnan 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.06 (20%) 0.23 (80%) 0.29 0.16 (72%) 0.06 (28%) 0.22 
Gansu 0.00 (1%) 0.03 (99%) 0.03 0.06 (19%) 0.27 (81%) 0.33 0.19 (43%) 0.24 (57%) 0.43 
China 0.00 (1%) 0.03 (99%) 0.03 0.05 (24%) 0.17 (76%) 0.23 0.15 (14%) 0.95 (86%) 1.10 
6
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CHAPTER 4.    RETURN TO SCHOOLING IN CHINA: FROM 1988 TO 2013 
4.1 Introduction 
The economic reform policy since 1978 has transferred the economy in China from 
planned economy to market economy. In addition, other economic policies were implemented to 
stimulate the economic development. For example, foreign direct investment policy and special 
economic zones on 1980s, deregulation of labor migration in late 1980s, the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) reform in 1990s. With the transformation of economic system and 
technological innovation, wage determination is more influenced by market mechanism. As the 
annually GDP increased by around 10% from 1988 to 2013 (World bank, 2016), the labor 
demand for highly educated workers is increasing. Hence, I would expect the wage increasing 
for workers graduated from university or graduate school. 
Government implemented university enrollment expansion policy in 1999 in order to 
increase the labor supply of highly-educated graduates, improve the economy and reduce the 
unemployment pressure for young workers because of the SOEs reform. Between 1992 and 
1998, unemployment rate increased sharply due to SOEs reform and market economy reform. 
Poorly-operated SOEs collapsed or began to lay off the personnel. The restructuring of public 
sectors has prevented the firms from accepting university graduates on a large scale as before. 
Start from 1996, the system of assigned job position for university graduates in SOEs has been 
abolished and graduates had to find the jobs by themselves. 
However, several issues were found after this policy. First, universities had problems 
with hardware and funding shortages at the beginning period. Second, the enrollment expansion 
has distorted the supply and demand system of university graduates, which has directly led to a 
decline in the employment rate and salary of university graduates. In addition to the huge 
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employment demand, the decline in the quality of education caused by enrollment expansion and 
unreasonable curriculum structure have also become a major cause of employment difficulties 
for university graduates. 
In this study, I use five years of survey data (CHIPs data) from 1988 to 2013 to estimate 
the changing magnitude of the return to schooling and discuss the impact of higher education 
expansion on wages. The household registration disparity is also discussed because I suspect the 
impact of the policy on rural students may be different. I also analyzed the rate of return with 
respect to industry sector, occupation, ownership and region groups. 
This study is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the related literature and ways in 
which the education can affect wages. Section 3 provides the framework of empirical model and 
dataset. Section 4 presents estimated results. Section 5 summarized the conclusions. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Before starting the discussion of the rate of return for the estimated coefficient of the 
years of schooling, I would like to first outline the conditions sequences for the log wage - 
education equation. Becker(1964) undertook early studies investigating returns to schooling 
based on the human capital theory. Students do not get employed until thy graduate from school, 
hence they have to afford the cost of schooling. The cost including direct costs, such as 
transportations, tuition, study supplies, and indirect costs including forgone earnings while in 
school. The model incorporates interest rates that allow people the borrow or lend to cover the 
costs and discount rate for future gain. The total investment can be computed by integrating the 
cost function by the years of education. Similarly, the schooling benefit is computed by 
integrating the benefit utility function by time. By adding these two terms together, the earning 
for entire life from education can be computed. The purpose is to maximize the lifecycle benefit 
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with respect to schooling. The human capital theory indicates that an individual’s wage is 
determined by labor productivity. With the labor market in equilibrium, higher education implies 
higher labor productivity and causes higher wage. Mincer (1974) adopts the equation using a 
model for log earnings to depict the relationship between the education and experience and 
earnings; and the coefficients of education express the return to schooling. To make this equation 
to be an internal rate for the estimated coefficient of the years of schooling (or schooling 
completion group), we assume that (1) labor market in equilibrium for all schooling completion 
levels over time; (2) individual have an infinite life; and (3) the log wage – age profiles are equal 
distance expect. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) model is usually used to estimate for the rate of return. 
However, the OLS method might lead to the biased estimates (inaccurate observed years of 
schooling). Proxy variables (instrumental variable method, for example, parental education or 
birth month as IV), or Heckman two-step method (2SLS) are also utilized. The estimated results 
are different due to different period and methods in China. It is observed that the estimated return 
to schooling values range from 1.4% (Byron and Manaloto, 1990) to 8.6% (Gao and Smyth, 
2015) from 1986 to 2010.  
Other factors can also affect the influence of education on wages. For example, knight 
and Shi (1996) found that the most important factor influencing a person’s education attainment 
is whether he lives in rural or urban area. The standardized mean difference in education 
attainment is no less than 4.6 years in favor of urban students. The estimated return to schooling 
among the rural area was 6.3% in Brauw and Rozelle’s (2008) research. Despite rural workers 
can find jobs in the urban area without barriers, the problem of discrimination against migrants in 
a given industry is becoming more serious. Even though other factors are held constant, the 
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unexplained component of the intra-industrial wage gap differentials between migrants and local 
urban workers rises from 19.4% in 2002 to 68.0% in 2013 (Ma, 2016). The return to schooling 
can also be affected by the ownership type of employers. With the economic opening, private 
enterprises and foreign investment enterprises are dramatically developing after the 1980s. The 
market wage determinants mechanism affects the wage levels in these private sectors greatly. 
However, the wage structures were different between public and private sectors, and indicated 
that human capital exerted greater influence on wages among private than publics (Dong and 
Bowles, 2002; Xing, 2006; Demurger, Fournier, Li, and Wei, 2007). Ma (2016) found that the 
firm-specific human capital (tenure years) becomes more important in wage determination 
mechanism along with market-oriented reform in SOEs. Hence, the influence of educational 
level on wages may differ between various groups (urban vs rural workers, public vs private 
sectors). 
My study contributes to this study as follows. First, I analyze the changes in return to 
schooling from 1988 to 2013 and the rate of return by various education groups. Second, I 
discuss the college expansion policy on the changes of rate of return and wages. Third, rate of 
return differs by household registration and I further discussed the disparity of rate of return for 
urban, rural and migrant workers. Lastly, rate of return is estimated for several groups: industrial 
sectors, occupation groups, ownership groups and regional groups from 1988 to 2013. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Model assumptions 
The assumptions and rationale for the wage equation – based an assumption of investing 
in one year of schooling after receiving the primary school diploma.  
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Let PV0(C0) = W0, the real annual wage rate of a primary school graduate (assumed to be 
the same over time).      
Let W1 = The real annual wage rate after one year of middle school education (assumed 
to be unchanged over time) 
The present-discounted value of getting one year of middle school education with an 
infinite life is: 
PV0 (Benefits) 1 01 ( ) / (1 )
tW W r

= − + = (W1 – W0)/r  
 
where r is the real interest rate, maybe 2%. 
 
If the labor market is in equilibrium for these two types of skilled individuals in all 
period, and the net present value of this investment is zero, we have the following relationship: 
NPV0 = - W0 - (W1 – W0)/r = 0 
And 0 = – r W0 + W1 – W0  = W1 –(1+r)W0 
And W1 = (1+r)W0 
         Therefore for the first year of middle school we have:  
  
                   lnW1= lnW0 + ln(1+r) ~ lnW0 + r 
 
          For an investment in the 2nd year of middle school, we have: 
 
       lnW2= lnW1 + ln(1+r) ~ lnW1 + r = lnW0 + 2r           
 
         In general, we then have equation for investing in S year of added schooling:  
 
lnWS = lnW0 + r S, i.e., the Mincer-Becker wage equation, and r is the average rate  
 
of return on S years of schooling. 
 
Note: We ignore the direct cost of further education (books, tuition, and fees), assume (Wt 
– Wt-1) is constant over time, individual has an infinite life.  In the case of China, the labor 
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market with different levels of schooling might not be in equilibrium over the infinite future (see 
figure 4.1).        
4.3.2 Model 
In this chapter, I adjust the Mincer-Becker wage equation to the following regression 
model: 
ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀 
Where 𝑆 = {
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 6  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 > 6
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Where, ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the dependent variable (logarithmic value of annual wage); 𝑖 denotes 
individuals; 𝑆 is the additional years of schooling after receiving the primary school diploma; 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 denotes experience years; 𝑒𝑥𝑝2 denotes the experience squared that captures the concavity 
of the age-earnings profile; 𝑋 are the other factors which affect the individual wage (e.g. gender, 
party, regions); 𝛽0 indicates the natural log of the real annual wage rate of a primary school 
graduate; and 𝜀 is error item. The 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜 𝛽𝑥 are estimated coefficients. Here, 𝛽1 indicates the 
estimated rate of return on additional years of schooling after receiving the primary school 
diploma.  
To estimate the private rates of return to different levels of education, we change the 
variable 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 to 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙: 
ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀,       𝑗 = 1 … 7 
Where 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 indicates the levels of education dummies for each 𝑗. In this study, 
they are junior high school; senior high school; vocational school; university; and graduate 
school.  
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The rate of return by various education category groups, 𝑟𝑗, is estimated by comparing the 
adjacent dummy variable coefficients: 
𝑟𝑗 =
𝛽1𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑗−1
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 − 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗−1
 
Where, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 is the number of years of schooling at the 𝑗𝑡ℎ level. 
I assume 6 years of schooling at primary school, additional over the previous year of 
schooling is 3 for junior high, 3 for senior high or vocational school, 4 for university, 3 for 
graduate school.  
To investigate the interaction effect of registration and education, two methods are used. 
The first is to use subsamples (urban, rural and migrant), the second is to use the following 
equation: 
ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑗𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑖
∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖
+  𝛽5𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀,       𝑗 = 1 … 7 
Where 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 indicates the household registration (Urban = 0, Migrant = 1, Rural 
= 2). 𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the interaction term of 𝑆 and 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. If 𝛽3 is statistically 
significant, it indicated that rate of return differs by household registration even though the 
human capital is the same.  
I also use the subsamples to estimate the rate of return among several groups: (1) industry 
sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary); (2) Occupation (manager, technician, clerk, and 
manual worker); (3) Ownership (government, SOE and private); (4) Regions (East, Central and 
West).  
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4.3.3 Data 
Data used in this chapter are from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey 
data for year 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013. These surveys were carried out as part of a 
collaborative research project on incomes and inequality in China organized by Chinese and 
international researchers, with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The five 
CHIP waves contain surveys of urban and rural individuals and households. In view of the 
increased importance of rural-to-urban migration, and because the urban and rural household 
subsamples do not adequately cover migrants, the survey added a survey of rural-to-urban 
migrants since 2002. Thus, the 2002, 2007 and 2013 CHIP survey includes three subsamples: 
rural, urban and migrant while the 1988 and 1995 CHIP survey includes rural and urban only. To 
consider the impact of higher education expansion and household registry differences on rate of 
return, all available survey data are used. The samples are composed of 17,898(CHIP1988), 
12,413(CHIP1995), 21,268(CHIP2002), 20,514(CHIP2007), and 24,328(CHIP2013) individuals 
in 31 provinces and municipal cities, which covers nearly the whole of China. The CHIP also 
includes respective information about individual characteristics and job information.  
Several types of data are dropped. First, individuals with missing data are dropped. 
Second, individuals with annual wage that is less than 100yuan are dropped in order to decrease 
the influence of outliers on the regression results. Third, the individuals between 22 and 65 are 
included while the retired and unemployed workers are excluded.  
The dependent variable for the wage function is the logarithm of the annual wage. The 
wage is defined as the total earnings from work and the work-related cash transfer (including the 
benefit and compensation). Nominal wage is adjusted by CPI in each year (2010=100), provided 
by World Bank. The explaining variables are the variables likely to affect the wage, such as 
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years of schooling or education category dummy variables (no schooling; primary school; junior 
high school; senior high school; vocational school; university; and graduate school), experience 
years (calculated by age - 6), male dummy variable (male = 1, female = 0), communist party 
member (yes = 1), Han dummy variable (yes = 1), and regions (East, Central, West) dummy 
variables. 
The statistical description of variables is shown in Table 4.1a-d. From 1988 to 2013, 
average number of years of schooling increased from 9.3 to 10.2 years for all workers; from 9.5 
to 11.7 years for urban workers; from 7.6 to 9.2 years for rural workers. Urban workers 
experience around 1.9 to 3.7 years more schooling than rural workers. The gap increased from 
1988 to 2013 and was highest in 2007 (3.7years more schooling for urban workers). Before 
2007, the average schooling for rural workers were still less than 9years although the compulsory 
education started in 1986. Comparing rural to urban migrants and rural workers, the migrants 
have around half more years of schooling, but still two to three years less than their urban 
counterparties.  
The proportion of urban workers who obtained at least as college degree increased from 
7% in 1988 to 20% in 2013 while that of rural workers only increased from 1% in 1988 to 3% in 
2013. It is shown that along with the implementation of the higher education expansion policy 
since 1999, the proportion of high-level education workers increased by 9% in urban area and 
only 3% in rural area between 2002 (the prior period of new workers graduated from the college) 
and 2013 (the year with most up to date information). Hence, we can conclude that the urban 
students take more advantage of this policy than the rural students. The students from the same 
province, no matter from urban or rural area, take the same College Entrance Examination, and 
the university admissions do not distribute more quota on the urban students. Instead, all students 
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in the same province are treated equally, the admission only depends on the examination scores. 
The emergence of so-called urban students has higher probability to go to college is not because 
of the rules of university admission, it is that education varies from primary to high school 
between urban and rural area. Although the students from either rural or urban area go to primary 
school, junior high school and senior high school, the overall quality of these schools in cities is 
better than those in towns. In addition, children in urban areas receive better family education 
than rural areas.  
Table 4.2a summarized the mean value of log annual wage and Table 4.2b calculates the 
wage gaps between primary school and higher education category groups. The reference group is 
the wage mean value of “primary school” (lowest-level education group). First, the wages are 
higher for higher degree obtained. Workers with primary school diploma has the lowest average 
wages and workers graduated from graduate school have the highest average wage in each year. 
The average wage fluctuated around the senior high school wage level.  
Second, the average wage gaps between the primary school graduates and the graduate 
school graduates widened from 29 in 1988 to 133 in 2013 (in percentage point difference). The 
wage gap between primary school graduates and senior high school graduates increased from 7 
points in 1988 to 40 points in 2013 while the gap between the senior high school graduates and 
graduate school graduates increased from 23 points in 1988 to 93 points in 2013. This indicates 
that the rate of return is getting higher: the workers with lower education level were receiving 
lower wage while workers with higher education level were receiving higher wage. The increase 
in wage for urban junior high school graduates from 11 points to 18 points between 2002 and 
2007 is due to the National Minimum Wage policy first implemented on 2003. The wage gap of 
university graduates to senior high school graduates decreased by 15 points for urban workers, 
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14 points for rural workers, and 24 points for migrant workers between 2007 and 2013. These 
results may be caused by the labor supply due to the college expansion and the demand for high-
level education workers differing by household registration. For rural to urban migrants, their 
average wage for each education level is relatively lower than their urban counterparties. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Results of returns to additional schooling after primary school 
Table 4.3a-d summarized wage function results. The coefficient of years of schooling is 
estimated rate of return. Estimation (1) used the total sample, Estimation (2) used subsamples: 
rural, urban or rural-to-urban migrant.  
First, the coefficients of years of schooling are 2.7% in 1988, 4.9% in 1995, 7.6% in 
2002, 4.5% in 2007 and 7.2% in 2013 for total sample. For urban workers, the coefficients are 
2.6% in 1988, 4.9% in 1995, 8.8% in 2002, 6.6% in 2007 and 9.0% in 2013. For rural workers, 
the coefficients are 4.9% in 1988, 5.0% in 1995, 7.1% in 2002, 3.1% in 2007 and 5.6% in 2013. 
For rural-to-urban migrants, the coefficients are 4.3% in 2002, 3.1% in 2007 and 4.6% in 2013. 
That is, the estimated rate of return increased by 4.9% from 1988 to 2002 and decreased by 3.1% 
from 2002 to 2007, then increased by 2.7% from 2007 to 2013. Overall, the rate of return 
increased by 4.5% during the whole period. 
The increase in rate of return from 1988 to 2002 was caused by increase demand for 
high-level education workers. However, the rate of return decreased from 2002 to 2007. Since 
2002 is the prior year of new workers graduated from the college, university or graduate school 
after the high education expansion policy implementations and 2007 is eight years after the 
policy, the decrease in rate of return can be explained by the labor supply of high-level education 
workers increasing greatly. Since a lot of college graduates enter the job market at the same time, 
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the over education problem may exist, which is caused by the mismatch between the labor 
demand and supply. From 2007 to 2013, the rate of return start increasing again because the 
technology improved as well as the increased demand of high-skilled workers. 
Other factors also affect the wage level. One year more experienced workers have around 
3.5% to 6.3% higher wages during the period. Average wage for men increased from 11.8% 
(1988) to 32.9% (2013) than that for women. That is, the gender wage gap increased by 21.1% 
from 1988 to 2013. Urban communist party members have relatively higher wage during 1995 
and 2013. Most state sectors require the employees to participate in the communist party and the 
university also encourage the students to be the probationary party member. However, the impact 
is decreasing year by year as the large private enterprises are improving their compensation and 
the state sectors are not always the “dream” employers for students. To compare with the 
minority group, the wage is 3% to 18.7% higher for Han majority group and the dummy variable 
is not statistically significant in 1988 and 1995. When the other factors are consistent, the wage 
is around 21.4% to 49.6% higher for urban residents and 16.6% to 48.3% higher for rural to 
urban migrant residents than that for rural workers during the period. In addition, it is shown that 
the wage gap by registration system became smaller from 2002 to 2013. This might be because 
the improvement in the working environment for migrant workers, the increase in short-term out-
for-work rural residents for temporary jobs in cities and the push forward of household 
registration reform. In addition to the registration discrepancy, there are regional wage gaps. 
Compared to West region, the East region has 10.3% to 44.3% higher wage during the whole 
period while the Central region only has relatively higher wage after 2007. 
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4.4.2 Rate of return by household registration 
Table 4.4 summarizes the results of rate of return by registration. The estimation (1) used 
the subsamples: urban, rural and migrant. Estimation (2) uses the interaction of years of 
schooling and household registration. It shows the household registration disparity of rate of 
return based on the assumption that the other factors are similar.  
First, the estimation (1) shows the rate of return is higher for rural workers than urban 
workers in 1988 and 1995 (2.6% vs 4.9% in 1988, 4.9% vs 5.0% in 1995) while the urban 
workers have higher rate of return during 2002 and 2013 (8.8% vs 7.1% in 2002, 6.6% vs 3.1% 
in 2007, 9.0% vs 5.6% in 2013). Migrant workers have lower rate of return than rural workers 
(4.3% vs 7.1% in 2002, 3.1% vs 3.1% in 2007, 4.6% vs 5.6% in 2013). 
Second, the estimation (2) shows that when years of schooling and individual 
characteristics are consistent across three registration groups, the rate of return for rural workers 
is 2.1% lower in 2007 and 1.8% lower in 2013 than that for urban workers. The rate of return for 
migrant workers is 3.1% lower in 2002, 2.5% lower in 2007 and 3.6% lower in 2013 than that for 
urban workers. 
In both estimation results, we can conclude that the rate of return is lower for rural and 
rural to urban migrant workers. There are several reasons for the disparity. 
First, the lower rate of return for rural workers could be due to the discrimination 
hypothesis. The employer, colleague or customer prefer an urban worker rather than a rural 
worker, even though the education levels are similar. Discrimination against rural workers and 
migrant workers are caused by the household registration system. The policy of decentralization 
has contributed to the marginalization among rural migrants in urban China (Wong, 2007). Since 
most of the migrant workers are uneducated and do not have special skills, job mobility among 
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them is very low. Hence, they are lacking knowledge of the legal rights and subject to a great 
deal of exploitation. For example, delays in wage payment, work overtime without pay, required 
cash deposits with the firm to prevent the workers from leaving freely. In addition, the migrant 
workers are frequently portrayed negatively in social media. They are perceived as a threat to 
social stability and linked to the increase in crime rates in the cities. Hence, the public holds the 
view that migrant workers are ignorant and then widened the social gap between migrant 
workers and local residents.  
Second, with the improvement of agricultural productivity and the acceleration of 
industrialization, Chinese government implemented urbanization strategies at the beginning of 
21st century. With the process of urbanization, we could assume the rural workers who stay at 
home and participate in agricultural activities would not be affected because the only thing 
would affect them is the future land system policy. However, the rural workers who have already 
work in big cities will be affected by urbanization. When they live and work in cities, they have 
to pay the same tax as urban workers but their benefits of all aspects of public services cannot be 
guaranteed. Instead, the urban workers enjoy the more weighted resources from the government 
and other investment from foreign companies. Hence, we could say the urbanization lead to the 
unequal resource allocation and economic development between the urban and rural areas and a 
series of issues have not been solved (for example, rural property circulation, regular job 
positions available for migrant workers, education for migrant children, asset gap between urban 
and rural families). 
Third, the higher rate of return for rural workers in 1988 could be due to the self-
selection. There were less than 1% of rural workers go to higher education (compared to 7-11% 
of urban workers). In early stages, majority of rural workers who stay at home and participate in 
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agricultural activities and do not need education. The scarcity of high educated workers in rural 
area may cause the rate of return to be greater than urban workers. When the need for high-level 
education workers is greater in rural area, the rate of return will be higher for rural workers. 
However, because of higher opportunities and payback in big cities, the labor environment for 
high-educated migrant workers have been improved. Majority of rural students who have 
graduated from a well-known university would stay in cities.  The wage for those workers have 
no difference from their urban counterparties. Hence, we would expect the rate of return of 
higher education group for migrant workers higher than that for rural workers in the future. 
4.4.3 Results of returns to schooling by various education category groups 
The rate of return between the various education category groups after primary school are 
summarized in Table 4.5a-d. From 1988 to 2013, the coefficient increased from 12.6% to 19.3% 
for junior high school, increased from 23% to 32% for senior high school, increased from 20.2% 
to 44.6% for vocational school, increased from 27.4% to 73.7% for university.  
Wage gaps between the various education category groups fluctuated over the period. 
The coefficient differences between “junior high” and “university” education group increased 
from 14.8% in 1988 to 57.1% in 2013. The coefficients for “university” increased from 27.4% in 
1988 to 73.7% in 2013. However, the value decreased from 79.5% in 2002 to 66.1% in 2007. 
This result may be caused by the implementation of the higher education expansion policy since 
1999.  
It is found that the intra-group wage gap differs by household registration. In both 1988 
and 1995, the coefficients of education category dummy variables were greater for rural workers 
excepting the senior high category. From 2002 to 2013, the coefficients are greater for urban 
workers than rural workers among almost all education groups. For migrant workers, the 
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coefficients for each education category increased over time. The coefficients were higher than 
rural and urban workers in 2013 for “graduate” groups. 
The rate of return for the various education category groups are summarized in Table 4.6. 
In 1988, the “Junior high school” groups have the highest rate of return (4.2%). In 1995 and 
2002, the “vocational” group has the highest rate of return (7.2% in 1995 and 12.6% in 2007). In 
2007, the “university” group has the highest rate of return (13.9%). In 2013, the “graduate” 
school has the highest rate of return (13.4%). This indicated the trend of the demand of high-
level educated workers. The rate of return for “university” group increased from 1.1% in 1988 to 
13.9% in 2007. Although the higher education expansion increased the labor supply of university 
graduates, the explosion of technological innovation resulted in the higher demand of high-level 
education workers. However, the rate of return for “university” group decreased to 10.4% in 
2013. This indicates that the influence of higher supply of university graduates is greater than the 
labor demand. At the same time, the rate of return of “graduate school” group increased from 
4.6% in 2007 to 13.4% in 2013. The increase in rate of return indicated that the expansion policy 
positively affects the wage for the highest-level education group. This could also be due to the 
stricter requirement for education and skills. 
Comparing the return to schooling of vocational school with senior high school, the rate 
of return for “vocational school” is higher than “senior high school” since 1995. As education 
after junior high school are not mandatory, students who choose to go to senior high school are 
more likely to be admitted to university while students who go to vocational school are more like 
to work after school. These results indicated that skilled workers have higher wage when 
comparing high school graduates and vocational school graduates. If we assume all high school 
graduates go to university, the rate of return for “vocational school” is lower than “university” 
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after 2007, which indicated the higher labor demand for high-level education group because of 
the industry transition from low-technological level to higher level. 
The rate of return differs by household registration for each education category. For 
example, the rate of return of higher education levels are lower for rural workers than urban 
workers as the education quality is higher in urban area. The migrant workers have the highest 
rate of return for “graduate” group and the lowest rate of return for other education groups, 
which could also be due to the competition in urban area. 
4.4.4 Rate of return by industry, occupation, ownership and region groups 
The results of rate of return by industry sector, occupation, ownership and regions are 
summarized in Table 4.7. Subsamples are used to estimate the return to schooling.  
First, the rate of return is greater for tertiary industry than other industries from 1995 to 
2007. The rate of return for tertiary industry increased from 3.5% in 1995 to 7.6% in 2013. As 
the industry sector of China improves every day with the great leap of science and technology, 
the labor demand for high-skilled workers are increasing, increasing the rate of return for tertiary 
industry. 
Second, the rate of return for technician has become the highest among all occupations in 
recent years, followed by clerk. The gap of rate of return between the technician and other 
occupations are increasing. Since technicians need skills that is directly related to the education 
years, the results indicate that the higher education level the higher the wage.  
Third, the rate of return is greater for government organizations than state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private sector in recent years, and the rate of return of SOEs is greater 
than private sector from 1995 to 2013. In 1988, the private sector has the highest rate of return 
while SOEs has the highest rate of return in 1995. In addition, the rate of return for public sectors 
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(government and SOEs) has higher increases in rate of return than private sector from 1988 to 
2013 (government increased from 1.8% to 9%, SOEs from 3.2% to 8.0% and private from 4.5% 
to 6.2%). This may due to the SOEs reform, transferring from planned economy to the market 
mechanisms (market-based salary system). 
Fourth, the rate of return in Eastern region is the highest in 2007 and 2013 because of the 
highest economic development in East China. The rate of return of Eastern region increased from 
2.5% in 1988 to 7.8% in 2013, whereas the rate of return of Central region increased from 2.7% 
in 1988 to 6.3% in 2013, Western region increased from 3.3% in 1988 to 7.5% in 2013. This 
result indicates the higher demand of highly-educated workers in the East.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study computes the empirical results of rate of return (return to schooling after 
primary school) from 1988 to 2013 using the CHIP data. The estimated rate of return is 2.7% for 
1988, 4.9% for 1995, 7.6% for 2002, 4.5% for 2007 and 7.2% for 2013. Urban workers have 
significantly highest rate of return followed by rural workers. Rural to urban migrant workers 
have the lowest rate of return 
To compare the rate of return for different education groups, the rate of return was higher 
for mid-level education groups in 1988, and the rate of return are higher for higher-level 
education groups in later period. Workers with graduate degree has the highest rate of return in 
2013.  
The higher education expansion policy implemented since 1999, the rate of return are 
affected. The rate of return for “university” group decreased from 13.9% to 10.4% in 2007-2013. 
However, the rate of return for “graduate school” group increased from 4.6% to 13.4% in the 
same period. There are two sides of explanation on rate of return. On one side, the increase in 
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labor supply of highly-educated graduates would decrease the rate of return. On the other side, 
the need for skilled workers due to the technology improvement would increase the rate of 
return. Hence, this policy negatively affected the rate of return at university level while 
positively affected the rate of return at graduate school level. 
By using the subsamples of various groups, I found the rate of return differs by industry, 
occupation, ownership and region groups. Tertiary industry sector, Technician, Government 
sector and East regions have the highest rate of return in recent years. 
As we can see the rate of return of workers with graduate degree are highest in 2013, 
which indicates the increasing labor demand of higher-educated workers than those only has 
bachelor’s degree. The increasing in rate of return for graduate school graduates can also 
improve the technology improvement in the industry. However, the higher education expansion 
policy only benefits the urban students (as few rural students be admitted to college from 
financial and ability perspective). In order to build an equal society, the education policy may be 
amended by government to increase the college quota for rural students as well as improve the 
education quality in rural regions. For workers migrate from rural to urban area, more social 
welfare (training, housing, health care, and labor union) are needed for those workers. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.1 Wage equation equilibrium figure 
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Table 4.1a Statistical description for total samples 
 
Total 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Annual wage (yuan) 5858 9252 12766 23888 29121 
Years of schooling 9.3 9.9 9.5 9.8 10.2 
Experience 32 33 33 31 34 
Experience_sq. 1048 1099 1102 992 1137 
Male 55% 54% 64% 62% 62% 
Communist Party member 69% 25% 21%  12% 
Han 96% 96% 94% 99% 95% 
Permanent worker 99% 96% 63% 59% 32% 
The married  90% 89% 81% 15% 
Industry sector      
Primary  44% 16% 2% 6% 
Secondary  3% 24% 39% 38% 
Tertiary  47% 50% 58% 56% 
Others  5% 11% 0% 0% 
Occupations      
Manager 8% 14% 17% 7% 4% 
Technician 16% 21% 11% 10% 13% 
Clerk 27% 19% 24% 33% 39% 
Manual worker 48% 40% 28% 36% 35% 
Others 2% 6% 19% 14% 8% 
Ownership      
Government 40% 54% 8% 9% 13% 
SOE 54% 42% 28% 32% 13% 
Private 1% 3% 44% 57% 65% 
Others 5% 1% 20% 2% 9% 
Regions       
East 43% 40% 39% 52% 41% 
Central 41% 34% 34% 31% 38% 
West 16% 26% 27% 18% 22% 
Education category      
No schooling 1% 1% 4% 1% 1% 
Primary 13% 6% 12% 11% 13% 
Junior high 38% 32% 38% 45% 44% 
Senior high 24% 24% 21% 19% 14% 
Vocational school 17% 30% 19% 18% 18% 
University 6% 7% 5% 6% 9% 
Graduate 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
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Table 4.1b Statistical description for urban workers 
 
Urban 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Annual wage (yuan) 5955 9205 14937 31033 35920 
Years of schooling 9.5 10.1 10.9 12.2 11.7 
Experience 32 33 35 34 34 
Experience_sq. 1056 1119 1215 1174 1184 
Male 53% 53% 56% 57% 57% 
Communist Party member 74% 26% 33%  21% 
Han 96% 96% 96% 99% 95% 
Permanent worker 99% 96% 81% 76% 58% 
The married  91% 90% 85% 88% 
Industry sector      
Primary  42% 4% 2% 6% 
Secondary  3% 32% 25% 22% 
Tertiary  51% 61% 72% 72% 
Others  4% 3% 0% 0% 
Occupations      
Manager 8% 14% 11% 7% 6% 
Technician 17% 23% 21% 23% 19% 
Clerk 25% 21% 32% 47% 49% 
Manual worker 51% 38% 29% 16% 21% 
Others 0% 5% 7% 7% 5% 
Ownership      
Government 44% 59% 16% 13% 26% 
SOE 55% 38% 52% 49% 23% 
Private 0% 3% 19% 35% 50% 
Others 0% 0% 13% 3% 1% 
Regions       
East 40% 37% 38% 50% 42% 
Central 43% 35% 35% 30% 35% 
West 17% 28% 27% 20% 23% 
Education category      
No schooling 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Primary 12% 5% 3% 3% 5% 
Junior high 38% 30% 24% 19% 26% 
Senior high 24% 24% 28% 26% 18% 
Vocational school 19% 32% 35% 34% 31% 
University 7% 8% 10% 15% 18% 
Graduate 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 
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Table 4.1c Statistical description for rural workers 
Rural 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Annual wage (yuan) 4844 9727 10338 18860 24171 
Years of schooling 7.6 7.8 8.2 8.5 9.2 
Experience 31 30 33 31 33 
Experience_sq. 965 905 1068 985 1120 
Male 74% 69% 77% 66% 66% 
Communist Party 
member 20% 14% 14%  7% 
Han 95% 97% 91% 99% 94% 
Permanent worker     15% 
The married  80% 85% 81% 84% 
Industry sector      
Primary  61% 37% 4% 7% 
Secondary  9% 17% 55% 49% 
Tertiary  28% 25% 40% 44% 
Others  3% 22% 0% 0% 
Occupations      
Manager 15% 13% 10% 7% 3% 
Technician 3% 4% 2% 5% 10% 
Clerk 51% 6% 13% 21% 31% 
Manual worker 19% 59% 36% 56% 46% 
Others 13% 18% 39% 11% 10% 
Ownership      
Government 2% 93% 4%  6% 
SOE 35% 7% 12%  6% 
Private 7% 0% 53%  73% 
Others 57% 0% 32%  15% 
Regions       
East 68% 74% 41% 51% 39% 
Central 21% 18% 32% 32% 39% 
West 10% 8% 27% 17% 22% 
Education category      
No schooling 5% 5% 6% 1% 2% 
Primary 27% 17% 19% 16% 18% 
Junior high 41% 48% 52% 58% 56% 
Senior high 21% 20% 16% 15% 12% 
Vocational school 4% 9% 6% 9% 10% 
University 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 
Graduate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 4.1d Statistical description for rural to urban migrants 
 
Rural to Urban Migrant 2002 2007 2013 
Annual wage (yuan) 12102 22778 33741 
Years of schooling 8.7 9.0 9.7 
Experience 29 28 31 
Experience_sq. 860 792 974 
Male 57% 62% 59% 
Communist Party member 3%  4% 
Han 91% 98% 95% 
Permanent worker 5% 38% 27% 
The married 94% 76% 12% 
Industry sector    
Primary 1% 0% 4% 
Secondary 15% 31% 27% 
Tertiary 76% 69% 69% 
Others 8% 0% 0% 
Occupations    
Manager 55% 6% 7% 
Technician 4% 0% 9% 
Clerk 28% 36% 52% 
Manual worker 7% 28% 27% 
Others 6% 29% 5% 
Ownership    
Government 1% 5% 4% 
SOE 10% 9% 10% 
Private 81% 85% 86% 
Others 8% 0% 0% 
Regions     
East 37% 55% 43% 
Central 34% 28% 40% 
West 29% 17% 17% 
Education category    
No schooling 10% 3% 1% 
Primary 23% 12% 14% 
Junior high 49% 57% 51% 
Senior high 14% 17% 16% 
Vocational school 4% 10% 14% 
University 0% 1% 4% 
Graduate 0% 0% 0% 
Note: Missing variables are dropped. 
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Table 4.2a Mean values of lnwage for each education levels 
Total Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.9  8.7 
1995 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.4  9.1 
2002 9.1 9.3 9.5 9.7 10.0  9.5 
2007 9.8 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.7 10.9 10.1 
2013 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.7 11.2 10.3 
        
Urban Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.9  8.7 
1995 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.4  9.1 
2002 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.7 10.0  9.6 
2007 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.7 10.9 10.3 
2013 10.0 10.2 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.3 10.5 
        
Rural Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.7 8.7  8.5 
1995 9.0 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.6  9.2 
2002 9.0 9.2 9.4 9.7 9.9  9.2 
2007 9.7 9.8 10.0 10.0 10.4 11.0 9.8 
2013 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.1 
        
Rural to 
Urban 
Migrant Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
2002 9.2 9.5 9.6 9.5 10.1  9.4 
2007 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.5 11.2 10.0 
2013 10.2 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.7 11.8 10.4 
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Table 4.2b Wage gaps between primary school graduates and higher education levels (in 
percentage points) 
Total Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 0 3 7 14 29  7 
1995 0 4 4 20 35  11 
2002 0 22 39 61 88  35 
2007 0 17 33 53 92 114 32 
2013 0 24 40 55 83 133 37 
        
Urban Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 0 17 22 27 42  22 
1995 0 3 3 20 35  11 
2002 0 11 26 47 73  36 
2007 0 18 27 50 80 100 45 
2013 0 22 41 54 79 127 50 
        
Rural Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
1988 0 14 15 29 30  10 
1995 0 17 20 30 51  15 
2002 0 24 43 66 88  25 
2007 0 15 28 34 73 136 17 
2013 0 23 30 40 61 70 23 
        
Rural to 
Urban 
Migrant Primary 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate Average 
2002 0 23 32 25 90  16 
2007 0 14 21 23 64 130 14 
2013 0 19 32 30 52 155 22 
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Table 4.3a Results of wage function based on one additional years of schooling after primary 
school for total sample 
Total 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Years of schooling 0.027*** 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.045*** 0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.063*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Experience_sq. -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.118*** 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.279*** 0.329*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.01) 
Communist Party member -0.083*** 0.153*** 0.162***  0.006 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Han 0.030** 0.030 0.187*** 0.074* 0.163*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.023) 
Urban 0.412*** 0.001 0.496*** 0.288*** 0.214*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
Migrant   0.483*** 0.166*** 0.298*** 
   (0.016) (0.009) (0.02) 
Regions (West)      
East 0.103*** 0.277*** 0.443*** 0.274*** 0.270*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
Central -0.141*** -0.095*** 0.012 0.030*** 0.051*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 6.999*** 7.400*** 7.212*** 8.728*** 8.271*** 
 (0.044) (0.071) (0.071) (0.054) (0.053) 
Observations 17898 12413 21268 20514 24328 
R-squared 0.2772 0.2180 0.2416 0.2232 0.2114 
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Table 4.3b Results of wage function based on one additional years of schooling after primary 
school for urban workers 
Urban 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Years of schooling 0.026*** 0.049*** 0.088*** 0.066*** 0.090*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Experience 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.047*** 0.081*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Experience_sq. -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.115*** 0.147*** 0.185*** 0.302*** 0.298*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
Communist Party member -0.077*** 0.149*** 0.165***  0.035** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)  (0.018) 
Han 0.035*** 0.024 -0.054* 0.068 0.103*** 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.029) (0.071) (0.036) 
Urban      
      
Migrant      
      
Regions (West)      
East 0.094*** 0.283*** 0.227*** 0.457*** 0.234*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
Central -0.146*** -0.082*** -0.077*** -0.021 -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
Constant 7.315*** 7.191*** 7.292*** 8.468*** 8.016*** 
 (0.039) (0.076) (0.096) (0.118) (0.094) 
Observations 16370 11383 10006 6798 9309 
R-squared 0.2871 0.2472 0.2275 0.2517 0.2167 
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Table 4.3c Results of wage function based on one additional years of schooling after primary 
school for rural workers 
Rural 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Years of schooling 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.071*** 0.031*** 0.056*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Experience 0.022** 0.017 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Experience_sq. -0.000* -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.181*** 0.018 0.159*** 0.274*** 0.348*** 
 (0.037) (0.048) (0.028) (0.012) (0.014) 
Communist Party member -0.028 0.103 0.126***  -0.101*** 
 (0.041) (0.065) (0.035)  (0.027) 
Han 0.006 0.056 0.296*** 0.070 0.181*** 
 (0.098) (0.216) (0.043) (0.068) (0.031) 
Urban      
      
Migrant      
      
Regions (West)      
East 0.251*** 0.041 0.824*** 0.128*** 0.318*** 
 (0.055) (0.108) (0.030) (0.016) (0.018) 
Central -0.036 -0.391*** 0.141*** 0.027 0.096*** 
 (0.060) (0.118) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019) 
Constant 7.471*** 8.522*** 7.346*** 8.955*** 8.538*** 
 (0.192) (0.303) (0.114) (0.089) (0.069) 
Observations 1528 1030 8062 8380 13869 
R-squared 0.0714 0.0833 0.166 0.1207 0.1488 
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Table 4.3d Results of wage function based on one additional years of schooling after primary 
school for rural to urban migrants 
Rural to Urban Migrant 2002 2007 2013 
Years of schooling 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
Experience 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.08*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) 
Experience_sq. -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0) 
Male 0.273*** 0.231*** 0.359*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.039) 
Communist Party member 0.046  0.076 
 (0.059)  (0.138) 
Han 0.034 -0.001 0.177** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.091) 
Urban    
    
Migrant    
    
Regions (West)    
East 0.205*** 0.286*** 0.112* 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.062) 
Central -0.021 0.073*** 0.039 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.061) 
Constant 8.136*** 8.942*** 8.460*** 
 (0.125) (0.080) (0.220) 
Observations 3199 5336 1150 
R-squared 0.133 0.1547 0.1448 
 
Note: 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significant in 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
2. Values in brackets estimated standard deviation. 
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Table 4.4 Results of registration disparity of rate of return  
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Estimation (1): years of schooling 
     
Urban 0.026*** 0.049*** 0.088*** 0.066*** 0.090***  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.071*** 0.031*** 0.056***  
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Migrant 
  
0.043*** 0.031*** 0.046***    
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009)       
Estimation (2) 
     
Years of schooling 0.025*** 0.048*** 0.074*** 0.055*** 0.082***  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural -0.49*** -0.039 -0.563*** -0.196*** -0.133***  
(0.025) (0.033) (0.025) (0.020) (0.02) 
Migrant 
  
0.073*** -0.015 0.237***    
(0.023) (0.021) (0.038) 
Years of schooling*Rural 0.034*** 0.016 0.024*** -0.021*** -0.018***  
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Years of schooling*Migrant 
  
-0.031*** -0.025*** -0.036***    
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
 
Note: Experience, male and other variables are also estimated but the results are not shown in 
this table. 
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Table 4.5a Results of rate of return after primary school by education category for total sample 
Total 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Education category (Primary school)      
Junior high 0.126*** 0.083*** 0.203*** 0.090*** 0.193*** 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) 
Senior high 0.230*** 0.151*** 0.335*** 0.105*** 0.320*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) 
Vocational school 0.202*** 0.298*** 0.582*** 0.324*** 0.446*** 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) 
University 0.274*** 0.427*** 0.795*** 0.661*** 0.737*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) 
Graduate   0.994*** 0.800*** 1.139*** 
   (0.049) (0.049) (0.041) 
Urban 0.408*** 0.001*** 0.454*** 0.27*** 0.206*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) 
Migrant   0.539*** 0.182*** 0.301*** 
   (0.016) (0.009) (0.02) 
Constant 6.918*** 7.401*** 7.225*** 8.732*** 8.260*** 
 (0.045) (0.071) (0.072) (0.053) (0.054) 
Observations 17817 12408 21262 20526 24322 
R-squared 0.2854 0.2237 0.2468 0.2429 0.2149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 
Table 4.5b Results of rate of return after primary school by education category for urban workers 
Urban 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Education category (Primary school)      
Junior high 0.112*** 0.059*** 0.139*** 0.104** 0.158*** 
 (0.01) (0.024) (0.037) (0.049) (0.036) 
Senior high 0.227*** 0.143*** 0.349*** 0.235*** 0.357*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) 
Vocational school 0.190*** 0.286*** 0.603*** 0.538*** 0.532*** 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.036) (0.049) (0.036) 
University 0.260*** 0.413*** 0.828*** 0.844*** 0.814*** 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.040) (0.050) (0.038) 
Graduate   0.995*** 0.963*** 1.218*** 
   (0.058) (0.067) (0.052) 
Urban      
      
Migrant      
      
Constant 7.225*** 7.191*** 7.280*** 8.350*** 8.025*** 
 (0.040) (0.073) (0.099) (0.118) (0.095) 
Observations 16293 11383 10006 6810 9308 
R-squared 0.296 0.2554 0.2524 0.3014 0.2252 
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Table 4.5c Results of rate of return after primary school by education category for rural workers 
Rural 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Education category (Primary 
school)      
Junior high 0.189*** 0.085 0.173*** 0.047*** 0.185*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019) 
Senior high 0.225*** 0.102 0.306*** 0.019 0.290*** 
 (0.048) (0.066) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) 
Vocational school 0.397*** 0.293*** 0.520*** 0.213*** 0.351*** 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.054) (0.024) (0.028) 
University 0.616*** 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.642*** 0.652*** 
 (0.087) (0.187) (0.218) (0.052) (0.035) 
Graduate    1.280*** 0.854*** 
    (0.020) (0.108) 
Urban      
      
Migrant      
      
Constant 7.398*** 8.556*** 7.395*** 8.951*** 8.515*** 
 (0.193) (0.311) (0.116) (0.083) (0.070) 
Observations 1524 1025 8059 8492 13864 
R-squared 0.0796 0.0769 0.1638 0.1269 0.1498 
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Table 4.5d Results of rate of return after primary school by education category for rural to urban 
migrants 
Rural to Urban Migrant 2002 2007 2013 
Education category (Primary 
school)    
Junior high 0.133*** 0.097*** 0.053 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.056) 
Senior high 0.207*** 0.149*** 0.160 
 (0.035) (0.024) (0.072) 
Vocational school 0.272*** 0.192*** 0.163 
 (0.051) (0.028) (0.079) 
University 0.578*** 0.527*** 0.508*** 
 (0.187) (0.101) (0.088) 
Graduate  1.279*** 1.696*** 
  (0.152) (0.137) 
Urban    
    
Migrant    
    
Constant 8.212*** 8.975*** 8.520*** 
 (0.125) (0.082) (0.218) 
Observations 3197 5224 1150 
R-squared 0.1307 0.1495 0.1587 
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Table 4.6 Results of return to schooling by various education category 
Total Junior high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate 
1988 4.2% 3.5% 2.5% 1.1%  
1995 2.8% 2.3% 7.2% 6.9%  
2002 6.8% 4.4% 12.6% 11.5% 6.6% 
2007 3.0% 0.5% 7.8% 13.9% 4.6% 
2013 6.4% 4.2% 8.4% 10.4% 13.4% 
      
Urban Junior high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate 
1988 3.7% 3.8% 2.6% 0.8%  
1995 2.0% 2.8% 7.6% 6.8%  
2002 4.6% 7.0% 15.5% 12.0% 5.6% 
2007 3.5% 4.4% 14.5% 15.2% 4.0% 
2013 5.3% 6.6% 12.5% 11.4% 13.5% 
      
Rural Junior high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate 
1988 6.3% 1.2% 6.9% 9.8%  
1995 2.8% 0.6% 6.9% 16.6%  
2002 5.8% 4.4% 11.6% 10.2%  
2007 1.6% -0.9% 5.5% 15.6% 21.3% 
2013 6.2% 3.5% 5.5% 9.1% 6.7% 
      
Migrant Junior high 
Senior 
high 
Vocational 
school University Graduate 
2002 4.4% 2.5% 4.6% 9.3%  
2007 3.2% 1.7% 3.2% 9.5% 25.1% 
2013 1.8% 3.6% 3.7% 8.7% 39.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103 
Table 4.7 Results of return by industry sector, occupation, ownership and regions  
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Industry sector 
     
Primary 
 
0.035*** 0.064*** 0.036*** 0.099***   
(0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Secondary 
 
0.028** 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.057***   
(0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tertiary 
 
0.035*** 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.076***   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Occupations 
     
Manager 0.010*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.049***  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Technician 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.066*** 0.045*** 0.081***  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Clerk 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.077*** 0.047*** 0.068***  
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manual worker 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.048*** 0.025*** 0.056***  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ownership 
     
Government 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.072*** 
 
0.09***  
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
SOEs 0.032*** 0.058*** 0.071*** 
 
0.080***  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
Private 0.045** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
 
0.062***  
(0.023) (0.017) (0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
Regions 
     
East 0.025*** 0.046*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.078***  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Central 0.027*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.038*** 0.063***  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
West 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.082*** 0.050*** 0.075***  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
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CHAPTER 5.    CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates the convergence trend of per capita GDP, income inequality 
and return to human capital after reform. Chinese society is segregated between urban and rural 
areas by the household system. China’s labor market has been potentially influenced by this 
system. With the release of free migration policy, if the reallocation of human capital can 
improve the economic growth has been become an important issue in China. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, the convergence pattern of per 
capita income can be observed in recent period (2004-2015), mainly in coastal regions due to 
more open economy, higher education and higher net migration rate. The growth can be 
explained by the reallocation of human capital from agriculture sectors to industry and service 
sectors. The interior regions with the scarce resources and loss of human capital present lower 
convergence. 
Second, although the growth in China is remarkably high, the income inequality is 
widening due to the economic transition. The natural log of income differences across provinces 
increased by 3.06 between 1998 and 2013. The overall individual level income variance 
increased from 0.16 in 1988 to 0.64 in 2013. From the perspective of industrial level of income, 
the knowledge intensive industries have higher wages than labor intensive industries. However, 
the within-industry sector income inequality is higher than between-industry sector income 
inequality which is due to the difference in the speed of education investment, return to 
schooling and employment share change in each industry. 
Third, the education investment and return to schooling has been lower and rising less 
rapidly. Higher education expansion policy in 1999 and the household registration disparity 
might be two important reasons. From the result, we concluded that the average years of 
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schooling increased from 9.3 years to 10.2 years only from 1988 to 2013. The average rate of 
return on additional schooling after primary school increased from 2.7% in 1988 to 7.2% in 2013 
for the entire workers, from 2.6% to 9.0% for urban workers, from 4.9% to 5.6% for rural 
workers, and from 4.3% to 4.6% for rural to urban migrant workers. Obviously, the return is 
greater for the urban workers and the high-level education groups. The higher education 
expansion policy resulted in decrease from 79.5% in 2002 to 66.1% in 2007 of return to 
university level education. In addition, the return is different by industry, occupation, ownership 
and regions. 
The limitation of this dissertation should be the dataset used for this research. In chapter 
one, there are only thirty-one provinces. It might be interesting to collect the city-level data 
because there are growth differences among cities within the same province and the 
interprovincial migration is much smaller than intraprovincial migration. However, the net 
inflow migration rate data is hard to collect in city level.  
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